CAT/C/60/D/653/2015 A.M.D.’s symptoms were consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. Despite that, the Board had found that there were no new facts that would justify reopening the case. The complainants maintained having established a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility of the complaint under article 3. 5.3 The complainants noted that, in its submission, the State party had maintained that the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board had found their statements to lack credibility, including the statement on torture; at the same time, the State party did not take into account A.M.D.’s physical and psychological situation. The complainants maintained that A.M.D. had been subjected to torture in the past and that he was therefore likely to experience serious difficulties if returned, as the risk of the authorities bringing him in for repeated interrogation, with accompanying torture, was very high. 5.4 As to the State party’s submission regarding the issue of the complainants’ passports, visas and tickets to Spain, the complainants submitted that they had indeed applied for visas for Spain in May 2013 but also that they did not go to Spain. The aeroplane tickets from Moscow to Barcelona for 20 July 2013 were not used and the complainants cannot be found on any list of passengers by the airline. 5.5 The complainants also submitted that, during the hearing before the Refugee Appeals Board on 19 December 2014, they were allowed to present a witness. The witness provided a long statement, testifying that their home had been burned down and that neither the neighbours nor the fire department had been allowed to help. The complainants maintained that in several reports about Chechnya it was mentioned that houses were burned to scare the owners. They also noted that the Board’s decision did not mention the testimony of the witness and that it was difficult to see whether the statement had been taken into consideration by the Board. They maintained that their witness was, like them, seeking asylum in Denmark and that he would only give a truthful statement before the Board or risk jeopardizing his own asylum application. 5.6 The complainants stressed that, although the Committee may not be an appellate body, they had brought their case before the Committee because the Danish Immigration Service and the Refugee Appeals Board had both denied A.M.D. the opportunity to undergo a medical examination for signs of torture and, when an examination was conducted by the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group, the State party did not take the results of that examination into account. State party’s further observations 6.1 On 24 March 2017, the State party submitted that the complainants’ additional observations of 15 September 2016 did not provide any new information on the circumstances in the complainants’ country of origin. It referred to its observations of 23 July 2015. It noted the complainants’ submission that an examination for signs that A.M.D. had been tortured was carried out by the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group on 19 December 2014 and that the results of that examination corroborated the allegations of torture and the claim that A.M.D.’s mental symptoms were consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. The State party submitted that, in the case at hand, the Refugee Appeals Board could not accept as fact A.M.D.’s account of the alleged torture and had found that the inconsistencies in crucial elements of his statements were not attributable to the alleged torture in his country of origin.14 6.2 The State party pointed out that the case law of the Refugee Appeals Board included cases like the present one in which the asylum seeker submitted that he or she sustained physical or mental injury originating from the relevant torture according to his or her own statement. Sometimes, the information given by the asylum seeker on his or her injuries was wholly or partly substantiated by medical examinations, and it was rather common for it to appear, from the conclusion of a medical examination report, that the objective 14 8 The State party refers to communications No. 565/2013, S.A.P. et al. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 25 November 2015, para. 7.4, and No. 209/2002, M.O. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 12 November 2003, paras. 6.4-6.6. It also refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 20 March 1991 in Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden (application No. 15576/89), paras. 77-82.