CAT/C/60/D/653/2015 findings were consistent with the asylum seeker’s statements on torture inflicted as a consequence of a conflict with the authorities. However, should the Board disregard the asylum seeker’s account of the circumstances that allegedly gave rise to the torture described — for example, because it could not in any way be considered as fact that the asylum seeker had been involved in politics or because the authorities had not discovered any such political involvement — such a conclusion would not independently give rise to a different assessment of the individual’s credibility or to an examination for signs of torture. The results of an examination for signs of torture merely indicated that the asylum seeker suffered from physical or mental injury, which may have been inflicted as described by the asylum seeker but may also have been inflicted in numerous other ways. In other words, an examination did not necessarily clarify whether the asylum seeker’s injury had been caused by torture at all or whether the injury sustained was caused by an incident like a fight, an assault, an accident or an act of war. Moreover, an examination could not ascertain the truthfulness of an explanation for why and by whom the asylum seeker in question was subjected to abuse. 6.3 The State party submitted that, in its decision of 26 May 2015 refusing to reopen the asylum proceedings, the Refugee Appeals Board had found that the examination for signs of torture could not lead to a different assessment of the credibility of the complainants’ statements on their grounds for asylum. The State party reiterated its submission regarding the inconsistencies in the complainants’ statements. The State party noted the Committee’s decision in communication No. 634/2014, M.B., A.B., D.M.B. and D.B. v. Denmark, adopted on 25 November 2016, in which it stated: “The Committee is of the view that the impartial and independent assessment of whether the reason for the inconsistences in his statements might be that he had been subjected to torture could have been made by the Board only after having ordered the first complainant’s examination for signs of torture.” The State party submitted that it disagreed with the view expressed in that decision and found that the circumstances causing an asylum seeker to request an examination for signs of torture did not in itself lead to an absolute obligation on the part of the immigration authorities to initiate such an examination, not even in cases in which an asylum seeker had produced medical information indicating that he or she might have been subjected to torture. It maintained that the issue of whether to initiate an examination for signs of torture must be determined on the basis of an individual assessment, including an assessment of whether the outcome of the examination must be deemed to be of significance to the Board’s decision. 6.4 With regard to the complainants’ submission that the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board failed to mention the testimony of the witness who had testified in their favour on 19 December 2014 (see paragraph 5.5 above), the State party submitted that the testimony of the witness was reproduced in the Board decision and that Board decisions were made on the basis of all the material presented, including the statements and testimonies made before the Board, even when no specific reference was made to such material, statement or testimony in the reasoning of the decision. The State party contested the complainants’ claim that the status of the witness as an asylum seeker affected his credibility. Additional comments from the complainants 7.1 On 2 May 2017, the complainants referred to their previous submissions. They noted that in its latest observation the State party had failed to comment on the submission that A.M.D. had assisted Chechen rebels during the period 2010-2013 by helping his brother. They also noted that the 19 December 2014 refusal of the Refugee Appeals Board did not address that submission in detail either, although the situation in Chechnya was a central issue in the case. The Board only said, in its decision, that A.M.D.’s statements had been inaccurate and focused on the question of how often the complainant’s brother had visited him. A.M.D. reiterated that not only had he been a sympathizer but had also cooperated with the rebels; he maintained that country background information clearly stated that previously suspected rebels were still in danger. That did not appear to have been taken into consideration by the Board. The relationship between A.M.D. and his brother, who was very active in the rebel movement, meant that the complainant was strongly exposed to the possibility of reprisal. The complainants did not know where the brother was or whether he 9