CCPR/C/130/D/2780/2016 handed down a judgment setting off the proceedings that would follow, they were living in the house. 6.4 M.F. is of the view that she has exhausted all available domestic remedies. With regard to article 17 of the Covenant, and referring to the case Kavanagh v. Ireland (CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998, para. 9.3), she contends that the main purpose of all the proceedings that she and her husband instituted or went through was to prevent the seizure of, and thus arbitrary interference with, their home. She therefore concludes that they have exhausted domestic remedies with respect to the violation of article 17 of the Covenant. 6.5 With regard to article 14 of the Covenant, the author maintains that, in substance, she and her husband raised Judge X’s lack of impartiality before the Court of Cassation.29 Before the Draguignan court and thus before Judge X, the authors could not express their fear. They needed this court, which handed down 18 judgments in the proceedings to which they were parties, to defend themselves from their adversaries. The Court of Cassation was not mistaken since, in its ruling, it overturned the judgment in question on the grounds that it “did not appear from either the judgment or the evidence that Crédit foncier de France invoked the absence of a date and signature”. M.F. concludes that domestic remedies in connection with the judge’s lack of impartiality have been exhausted. 6.6 Article L141-1 of the Code of Judicial Organization would not have provided for a useful or effective remedy within the meaning of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. The Draguignan court would have had jurisdiction if such a remedy had been sought. In view of the authors’ reputation with this court, such an approach would have been bound to fail. Opting for this possible remedy would have involved an appeal of the lower court’s decision, and M.F. had no resources other than the survivor’s pension benefit to which she was entitled through her late husband. Moreover, bringing the action before the court, after 25 years of proceedings, would have exceeded any reasonable time limit. The possibility of appeal provided by article L141-1 would not have enabled the authors to pursue all their claims, in particular those relating to arbitrary interference with their home. With the exception of the issue of time limits, article L141-1 covers only what are referred to as serious miscarriages of justice. Justice is not the only issue at stake, as M.F. also complains about the inaction of the Office of the Mortgage Registrar. An action based on article L141-1 would have been ineffective unless the claim is that the authors should have turned to the Draguignan court for relief in connection with the failure to resolve matters within a reasonable time and to the Committee for everything else. Under French legal precedents, there is no right to compensation for failure to render justice within a reasonable time when a case can be described as complex. It is very easy to assert that the sale at auction of the authors’ homes was a complex operation. There is no decision by the Court of Cassation that would make it possible for an individual to be awarded compensation for violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time in a case deemed complex. M.F. therefore concludes that article L141-1 of the Code of Judicial Organization is ineffective in her case. 6.7 M.F. points out that her lawyers expressly invoked, on numerous occasions, the right to a fair trial with reference to article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – that is, the equivalent of article 14 of the Covenant30 – before the Court of Cassation31 and the Court of Appeal.32 The right to a fair trial was always part of the arguments, in fact and in law, in accordance with the case Kavanagh v. Ireland, before most of the courts conducting the proceedings, including the highest national court. M.F. is therefore of the view that she has exhausted all possible remedies in respect of the right to a fair trial. 6.8 The claims relating to articles 2 (3), 7 and 17 of the Covenant could not have been considered by the French courts until all the proceedings had been seen through to completion, since these claims concern the impact of all these proceedings on the authors’ lives. The State party criticizes their failure to avail themselves of the possibility of appeal provided by article L141-1 of the Code of Judicial Organization. As noted above, this article would not have made it possible to obtain compensation for damages, including those caused by the Office 29 30 31 32 10 Exhibit No. 79. Kollar v. Austria (CCPR/C/78/D/989/2001), para. 8.6. Exhibit No. 71, pp. 5 and 16. Exhibits No. 61 and No. 66. GE.21-01892