CAT/C/71/D/790/2016 Committee as a communication under article 22 of the Convention. 10 Noting the observation of the State party that a second asylum application would have generated the right to remain in Switzerland until the end of the procedure, the Committee considers that the complainant has not effectively justified that she could not have raised the supposed proof in a separate, second, asylum application or that that remedy would otherwise be ineffective. The Committee therefore notes that article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention precludes it from examining the supposed proof. In the absence of proof presented to the domestic authorities, and noting that the complainant stated in the hearing before the State Secretariat for Migration that she did not belong to a sect or religious group, the Committee concludes that the complainant’s claimed membership of the Church of the Almighty God is manifestly unfounded in the sense of article 113 (b) of its rules of procedure, and that that element of the communication is consequently inadmissible. 9.5 The Committee sees no other obstacle to the admissibility of the remaining elements of the complaint, which were brought before the State party’s authorities and courts, and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 10.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 10.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the forced return of the complainant to China would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligations under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or return (refouler) an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 10.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to China. In making that assessment, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 11 However, the Committee recalls that aim of such an analysis is to determine whether the complainant would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be extradited.12 It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.13 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.14 10.4 The Committee takes note of the conclusion of the State party that the complainant’s statements are not credible and do not permit the conclusion that there are serious reasons to think that she would be exposed to torture in case of her return to China. Despite the complainant’s argument that the State party does not question her religious beliefs, the Committee notes that the State party refers to the domestic decisions, in which the State Secretariat for Migration found that her statements, in particular those concerning her religious beliefs practised since 2010, L’s arrest, the actions of L’s husband and the authorities’ pursuit, were particularly stereotypical, evasive and barely spontaneous, as well as contrary to all logic and the general experience. The State Secretariat for Migration also found that no evidence had been presented in support of those statements. The Committee notes that, in her appeal to the Federal Administrative Court, the complainant disputed that evaluation and claimed having responded coherently and clearly and having described in 10 11 12 13 14 8 F.M-M. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/46/D/399/2009), para. 6.5. Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 15.3; T.M. v. Sweden (CAT/C/68/D/860/2018), para. 12.3; and I.A. v. Sweden (CAT/C/66/D/729/2016), para. 9.3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.