CAT/C/38/D/249/2004 Page 9 Committee’s internal procedure regulations (rule 108), which authorizes stay of execution requests, and that such requests are not binding under international law. On the State’s obligation to cooperate in good faith with the Committee’s request, the Attorney General referred to the Committee’s allegedly frequent use of rule 108 and argued that the State’s obligation consists in undertaking a thorough and conscientious assessment of the Committee’s request and in complying with it as far as possible. 9.4 On the proceedings, counsel informed the Committee that on 27 February 2006, the Court of Appeal, when considering the request for reversal of its decision of 24 February 20055, had decided not to rule on the issue of interim measures until the main hearing. This hearing had not yet taken place at the time of submission of these comments by counsel. 9.5 Counsel claims that the State party violated its obligation to cooperate in good faith with the views of the Committee, when it deported the complainant to Pakistan, despite the standing request of the Committee of 2 April 2004 not to do so. The State party’s refusal to admit re-entry of the complainant after the Committee’s decision on admissibility and its invitation to comply with its request for interim measures further violated the State party’s obligation to cooperate in good faith with the Committee. 9.6 Counsel supports these claims with four arguments. Firstly, the request for interim measures was formally correct, as it was demonstrated that local remedies would not afford the complainant effective relief, and because the expulsion decision was enforceable. Secondly, she argues that the Committee has exclusive powers to interpret and act on its own rules, and that rule 108 requests are particularly important to protect the object and purpose of the individual complaint procedure. Thirdly she claims that the failure to comply with or communicate with the Committee about the request, before the expulsion of the complainant, constituted acts of bad faith. Counsel recalls the State party’s refusal to comply with the request, and the fact that the stay of expulsion was ordered after the complainant had filed a suit and not because of the Committee’s request. She further contends that rule 108 invites States parties to communicate with the Committee about the follow-up of requests, and that the State party did not take any steps to report back to the Committee. Fourthly, counsel claims that the above facts and the manner in which the complainant was deported show a pattern of abuse of rights by the State party, in particular because he was forced to travel without a valid passport, which showed a photograph of the complainant in military uniform. She contends that these facts were in contradiction to an agreement between the Norwegian police and the Pakistani embassy, and resulted in an offence under Pakistani immigration law. 9.7 Counsel suggests that the State party may have a duty to restore the situation as far as practically possible without violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, and that the duty to restore is a recognized principle of international law. 9.8 Finally counsel claims that the complainant should be awarded compensation for the State party’s non-compliance with the request for interim measures, the hardship suffered by the complainant and his family during the deportation process, and for the State party’s failure to grant legal aid. 5 See para. 8.4