01005730 Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC E313 members.330 Those who had been accused of being spies were enemies and were to be interrogated in security centres and smashed.331 The way in which “enemy” was defined was tactical, remaining vague enough to allow various interpretations and to create an uncertain atmosphere.332 However, the term was interpreted liberally and even Khmer Rouge cadre considered that innocents were falsely identified as enemies.333 118. The policy to smash enemies continued throughout the DK era though the policy evolved.334 From 1970, spies, including CIA, KGB and Vietnamese (“Yuon”), were regarded as the key enemies.335 Starting before 1975, former soldiers and 330 KAING Guek Eav Trial Judgement, para. 100; T. 18 May 2009 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 14; T. 24 October 2012 (LAY Bony), p. 40 (a former detainee at Trach Kraol Prison, explaining that the party would smash persons who tried to escape; they would be beheaded or executed); T. 11 January 2013 (CHHAOM Se), p. 104 (when he was in charge of a security centre, he received orders to execute prisoners); See also, T. 7 May 2013 (Philip SHORT), pp. 7-8 (to smash was to smash those who were not whole-heartedly with the revolution. Asking questions about the regime was a form of mental private property. If you had your own personal ideas which were different from those of the organisation (Angkar), this was a sign of being outside the revolution. Those with private views against the collective view were liable in the end to be smashed). 331 T. 19 March 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 41; Revolutionary Flag, E3/785, July 1973, ERN (En) 00713997, 00713999 (spies must be eliminated; “The stance to smash the spies is correct but it is inappropriately carried out”); T. 7 May 2013 (Philip SHORT), pp. 67-68 (the guiding principle was: Executing people is right when they are counter-revolutionary, when they are against the Revolution, but it must be done in a way which does not harm the Revolution’s goals. For example, you do not execute people in front of others. Through the KR period, people disappeared, they were taken away and didn’t come back.) 332 T. 20 July 2012 (David CHANDLER), pp. 11-12 (opining that the definition of enemy was intentionally kept vague for its menacing effect and creation of an uncertain atmosphere); Revolutionary Flag, E3/11, September 1977, p. 24, ERN (En) 00486235(the CPK favoured a tactical approach to defining the enemy during the first phase of the Revolution and it was important to gather “all forces that could be gathered”. Enemies were divided in three groups depending whether or not it was possible to win them over, to neutralise them, or to isolate them in order to be attacked). 333 T. 19 March 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 49 (stating that not all those who were sent to M-13 were in fact spies and he chose to release some of them); T. 20 March 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), pp. 19-20 (other groups were arrested without reason and sent to S-21, including Kong Socheat alias Soeun, son of Kong Sophal alias Keu, the chief of the regiment in 1975); T. 3 April 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), pp. 36-37 (members of the monarchy were also smashed between 1972 and 1973, including Prince Sirivudsara and his wife and Sisowath Pach). 334 T. 21 March 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 26; T. 18 July 2012 (David CHANDLER), pp. 22-24; T. 20 July 2012 (David CHANDLER), pp. 17-19, 129; T. 24 July 2012 (David CHANDLER), p. 57; See also, T. 7 May 2013 (Philip SHORT), p. 125 (enemies included all urban deportees); Book by P. SHORT: Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare, E3/9, 2004, p. 255, ERN (En) 00396455. 335 T. 21 March 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 26; T. 29 March 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 15; T. 3 April 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 36; T. 9 April 2012 (KAING Guek Eav), p. 4; T. 23 April 2013 (CHHOUK Rin), p. 34 (study session taught by POL Pot and NUON Chea discussed the elimination of the enemy that was burrowing from within including the KGB and CIA); T. 30 July 2012 (ROCHOEM Ton alias PHY Phuon), pp. 23-28 (IENG Sary identified American imperialists, CIA and KGB as the enemy); T. 11 July 2013 (Stephen HEDER), pp. 54-55; Article by S. HEDER: Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in Democratic Kampuchea Crimes: Cambodian Accountability in Comparative Perspective, E3/4527, p. 11, ERN (En) 00661465, fn. 57, 59; Nuon Chea Speaks on Case 002/01, Judgement, 7 August 2014 - Public 63