A/HRC/25/60 nature of [article 15] derives from the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and therefore implies an obligation for each State party to ascertain whether or not statements included in an extradition procedure under its jurisdiction were made under torture. It is therefore for the State to investigate with due diligence whether there is a real risk that confession or other evidence was not obtained by lawful means, including torture or other ill-treatment.24 Similarly, in the case of El Haski v. Belgium the European Court held that it will be necessary and sufficient for the complainant, if the exclusionary rule is to be invoked, to show that there is a “real risk” that the impugned statement was obtained under torture or other ill-treatment.25 Similarly, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights held that "once a victim raises doubt as to whether particular evidence has been procured by torture or other ill-treatment, the evidence in question should not be admissible, unless the State is able to show that there is no risk of torture or other illtreatment."26 3. Secret evidence and closed material procedures 34. There is a risk that the standard of proof applied to proceedings in which closed material is used is still much lower than in civil and criminal cases and the evidence in question may be heard in closed session from which the individual concerned and the legal representation of its own choice are excluded. 35. An increasing trend towards the use of secret hearings, “closed material procedures” and “secret evidence” can be observed. Further, there is a trend to extend the use of closed proceedings from military commissions and extradition proceedings to civil cases in which the Government considers that sensitive material should not be public because the disclosure would be damaging to national security and that the disclosure could potentially undermine the principle of confidentiality on which international intelligence-sharing arrangements are based. The definition of sensitive material is generally construed very broadly, meaning information which relates to, has come from or is held by the security and intelligence agencies. 36. The very secrecy of such evidence undermines the preventive element of the exclusionary rule. Wherever secret evidence is admitted there is an enhanced risk that evidence obtained by torture or other ill-treatment will be admitted, whether deliberately or inadvertently since such evidence cannot be challenged in open court.27 In addition, much of the closed evidence used in cases which concern national security is heavily reliant on information from secret intelligence sources. Such evidence may contain second- or thirdhand testimony or other material which would not normally be admissible in ordinary criminal or civil proceedings. Effective control of the implementation of the exclusionary 24 25 26 27 Kiti v. Morocco (CAT), op. cit., at 8.8; A/61/259 (2006), para. 63 and 65; See also E/CN.4/2001/66/Add. 2, para. 169 (i) and para.102; E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2; A/56/156 (2001) para. 39 (d); A/56/156, para. 39 (j); A/48/44/Add.1 (1993), para. 28; Human Rights Committee General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 41; E/CN.4/1999/61 Add. 1, para. 113 (e); Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. México (IACHR), op. cit., para. 176 El Haski v. Belgium, Application No. 649/08, ECHR (2012), para.. 88; see also Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the UK, Application no. 8139/09, ECHR (2012) Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt, Communication 334/06, ACHPR (2011); see also Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001 (2004), para. 7.4   See e.g. Mohamed et al. v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., (no 08-15693), US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 8 September 2010 (on 16 May 2011 the US Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit) 9