CCPR/C/124/D/2734/2016 established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.33 9.4 The Committee notes the author’s allegation that Italy granted her subsidiary protection in 2009, including a residence permit valid for three years, following which she was asked to leave the asylum centre, and that, despite having allegedly sought assistance from the local authorities, she did not receive any social or housing support and was left without shelter or means of subsistence. The Committee further notes the author’s previous experience of an unsafe environment and violence, which appears to be typical of the living conditions of homeless asylum seekers in Italy. 9.5 Furthermore, the Committee notes that the author has relied on various reports on the general situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy that have highlighted the chronic lack of available places in the reception facilities for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection. The Committee notes in particular the author’s submission that returnees who, like herself, had already been granted a form of protection and benefited from the reception facilities when they first arrived in Italy are no longer entitled to accommodation in public reception centres for asylum seekers and face severe difficulties in gaining access to health services upon their return (para. 3.2). 9.6 The Committee also notes the finding of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board that Italy should be considered the first country of asylum in the present case. It further notes the position of the State party that a country of first asylum is obliged to treat asylum seekers in accordance with basic human rights standards, although it is not required that such persons have the same social and living standards as nationals of that country (para. 4.4). The Committee further notes the State party’s submission that the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment cannot be interpreted as obliging States parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home or as entailing any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living.34 The Committee finally notes the information submitted by the State party according to which refugees granted subsidiary protection have access to health-care services on the same terms as Italian nationals and benefit from free health services on the basis of a self-declaration of destitution. 9.7 The Committee recalls that, when reviewing challenges to decisions to remove individuals from their territory, States parties should give sufficient weight to the real and personal risk such individuals might face if deported. 35 In particular, any evaluation of whether individuals are likely to be exposed to conditions constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of article 7 of the Covenant must be based not only on an assessment of the general conditions in the receiving country but also on the individual circumstances of the persons in question. Those circumstances include factors that increase the vulnerability of such persons and that could transform a situation that is tolerable for most into an intolerable one for others. They should also take into account, in cases considered under the Dublin III Regulation, the previous experiences of the individuals in the first country of asylum, which may underscore the special risks that they are likely to face if returned and may thus render their return to the first country of asylum a particularly traumatic experience for them. 36 9.8 The Committee notes the information provided to the State party by the Italian authorities in 2015, according to which an alien who has been granted residency in Italy as a recognized refugee or who has been granted protection status may submit a request to renew his or her expired residence permit upon re-entry into Italy. The Committee further notes the author’s claims, based on her personal circumstances, that despite being previously granted residency in Italy, she would face intolerable living conditions there. It also observes that, in her asylum screening interview of 23 July 2015, the author declared that she wanted to apply for asylum in Denmark rather than in Italy because her parents, 33 34 35 36 10 E.g., K. v. Denmark, para. 7.4. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 95. E.g., Pillai et al. v. Canada, para. 11.4; and Abdilafir Abubakar Ali and Mayul Ali Mohamad v. Denmark, para. 7.8. E.g., Y.A.A. and F.H.M. v. Denmark, para. 7.7. GE.19-02298