CCPR/C/124/D/2734/2016 are living in Denmark cannot lead to the conclusion that she risks being subjected to illtreatment in Italy, contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. 4.14 In conclusion, Italy can serve as the country of first asylum for the author and her child and, accordingly, their deportation to Italy would not entail a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. The communication has not brought to light any new, specific information about the author’s situation. Her allegations that she has been subjected to harassment and that she fears becoming homeless and not being able to receive assistance from the Italian authorities are unsubstantiated. Such a fear is not supported by her prior experience in Italy nor by background information. In addition, according to the Committee’s established jurisprudence,21 considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 5.1 In her comments of 12 October 2016, the author maintains that her return to Italy with her minor son would constitute a breach of article 7 of the Covenant and submits that the State party has failed to provide sufficient grounds to demonstrate that the communication is manifestly ill-founded. According to the UNHCR position on the standard of proof, “the decision-maker needs to decide if, based on the evidence provided as well as the veracity of the applicant’s statements, there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution.” 22 That view was later adopted by other international organs, most recently by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which held in its general recommendation No. 32 (2014) on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women (para. 50 (g)) that the threshold for accepting asylum applications should be measured not against the probability but against the reasonable likelihood that the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution or that she would be exposed to persecution on return. 5.2 The Danish Refugee Appeals Board has failed to assess whether the author’s child can be registered in Italy and if the Italian authorities know about him. It has also not sufficiently substantiated whether the author and her minor son can enter lawfully and take up lawful residence in Italy. She emphasizes that her stay in Italy was insecure and inconsistent. She was only offered accommodation from 2008 to 2009, when she was 17 years old and an asylum seeker. After being granted a residence permit, she was asked to leave the centre. The work she performed in Italy was illegal and offered to her by the Somalian network to which she no longer has a connection. She stayed at shelters that were open only from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. and she was never offered any help by the authorities. If she goes back to Italy, she will be more vulnerable with her minor son. Those shelters are not suitable for a small child, and the State party has not sufficiently proved that they will not be faced with homelessness and destitution upon return. 5.3 In the author’s case, it is not a question of the author’s material and social conditions being reduced, but simply a question of access to a minimum standard of living conditions. The Committee also stressed in Jasin v. Denmark that States parties should give sufficient weight to the real and personal risk a person might face if deported rather than rely on general reports and on the assumption that, as the author benefited from subsidiary protection in the past, she would, in principle, be entitled to work and receive social benefits. 23 The State party should also have undertaken a necessary and individualized examination of the risks regarding registration of the author’s son in Italy. 5.4 With regard to the fact that she has not renewed her residence permit, the author submits that every day struggled to find a job and housing. Whenever possible, she worked 21 22 23 GE.19-02298 P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.3; K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), paras. 7.4–7.5; N. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2426/2014), para. 6.6; Mr. X and Ms. X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/112/D/2186/2012), para. 7.5; and Z. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2329/2014), para. 7.4. UNHCR, An Overview of Protection Issues in Europe: Legislative Trends and Positions Taken by UNHCR, European Series, vol. 1, No. 3, 1995/09 (Geneva, 1995), p. 87. CCPR/C/114/D/2360/2014, para. 8.9. 7