OVERVIEW ON EU CROSSBORDER PROCEEDINGS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS The Court stated that, in this case, the executing state needed to request from the issuing state all necessary information in order to make sure that the conditions surrounding the execution of the European Arrest Warrant would be carried out such as to avoid any violation of Art 4 of the Charter and Art 23(4) of the EAW FD.330 If the issuing state can provide such guarantees, the executing state must therefore execute the arrest warrant.331 However, there may be situations whereby the executing authority would conclude that there are serious and established grounds to believe that, if the arrested individual is surrendered to the issuing state, the person would be at risk (as pointed out at paragraph 41). The executing state can come to this conclusion relying on the information provided by the issuing state and also on any other relevant information. Two conditions have been laid down in the preliminary ruling: the necessity to find there are substantial grounds to believe the arrested individual could see their health put at risk following paragraphs 41 and 42 on the one hand, and the obligation for this risk not to be short-term on the other hand.332 The Court subsequently stated that, based on the circumstances, it did not find it necessary to rely on Art 3 (right to integrity) and Art 35 (right to health care) of the Charter.333 The ruling did not provide any further explanation on the dismissal of other Charter provisions and followed its established jurisprudence by solely using Art 4 of the Charter. Finally, it must be pointed out that, despite the reliance on Art 4 of the EU Charter on the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Court did not apply the two-step test established in Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Therefore, when rendering a decision on health-related issues based on Art 23(4) EAW FD, the CJEU will check whether the health of the concerned individual will be at risk (risk of imminent death or risk of suffering a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health or a significant reduction in life expectancy) and observe that this 86 risk is not short-term. However, the Court will not check whether there are systemic or generalised deficiencies affecting an objectively identifiable group of persons to which the requested person belongs on the one hand, and whether there is a specific and precise analysis of the individual situation of the requested person vis-à-vis potential violations on the other hand.334In this sense, the CJEU’s approach when confronted with health endangerment of the concerned individual who needs to go through a cross-border transfer is closer to its jurisprudence related to asylum and migration than to its EAW jurisprudence. Indeed, the CJEU already decided that “even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible for examining the application for asylum, the transfer of an asylum seeker within the framework of the Dublin III Regulation can take place only in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment”.335 The E.D.L. ruling proves that the threshold to rebut the mutual trust presumption is very high at the level of the CJEU. This tendency is also illustrated in general by the two-step approach created by Aranyosi and Căldăraru, which requires that the individual proves first that there are systemic and generalised deficiencies in the state of the issuing authority and that there are good grounds to believe that the specific person that is subject to the EAW will indeed suffer a breach of their fundamental rights. It was argued during the consultation workshop that the second step should suffice in order to refuse the execution, as fundamental rights violations could take place in a specific detention centre and only there in a given statef. This high threshold, as found in E.D.L. and Aranyosi and Căldăraru, shows how the CJEU considers the principle of mutual trust and the presumption of the respect of fundamental rights by Member States as a priority.336