CCPR/C/130/D/2818/2016 Criminal Procedure and the limitations set out in article 99 (1) (a)–(f). The accused declared that he accepted this decision. 8. The reasons for solitary confinement, by reference to the relevant domestic provisions, are therefore clearly indicated by the judge. In page 6 of his complaint, the author acknowledges having understood such grounds: the crime committed was punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight years and there was the possibility of influence of witnesses and destruction of evidence. The State party, in this respect, refers, as does the author, to two grounds: the defendant was likely to hinder the investigation by removing evidence or influencing other defendants or witnesses; and detention on remand was necessary to protect others from the defendant or to protect the suspect from attacks or the influence of others (para. 4.12). A judge may decide that a defendant may be placed in solitary confinement if either of these conditions is met. That is exactly what happened. The State party also asserts that the author’s statements were erratic and that he was obviously in close contact with other defendants, which made it possible for him to remove evidence or consult his co-defendants (para. 4.13). 9. I therefore fail to see what other possible reasoning should be expected from the domestic court to substantiate its decision, at the outset of such a complex criminal investigation where most of the facts were still to be uncovered, evaluated and assessed, if not to refer to the possible two grounds for solitary confinement laid down in the relevant domestic provisions. The same applies to the second court decision, of 21 October 2009, to maintain the solitary confinement. The third court decision on solitary confinement, of 28 October 2009, issued scarcely 10 days after the arrest of the author, included a more substantial assessment of the facts, namely the detailed report of the Chief of Police in Suournes, who concluded: The investigation of the alleged slave trade is quite complicated and [the] police believes that the accused may encumber the investigation of the case and influence accomplices and or witnesses, or even remove evidence, if he has freedom of movement. Seven people are now in detention because of the case and there are substantial discrepancies in their testimonies to the police. 10. Under the circumstances, in view of the complexity of the case, the attitude of noncooperation of the author, the possible existence of a dangerous criminal organization operating in the territory of the State party, the need to keep the co-defendants apart from each other and the aim of ensuring an effective and thorough investigation free from undue interference by any of the defendants, to have kept the author in solitary confinement seems a reasonable decision. That conclusion was also reached by the Supreme Court, except for in its decision of 17 November 2009, when the limit of 28 days of solitary confinement had already been exceeded. 11. I thus fail to see how the domestic courts’ decisions can be found to be clearly arbitrary or to amount to a manifest error or to a denial of justice and would therefore have concluded that the State party has not violated the author’s rights under article 9 (1) of the Covenant for placing him in solitary confinement for 28 days or for keeping him in pretrial detention until his trial in March 2010. 13