CCPR/C/128/D/3012/2017 of her throat and that no further medical treatment or follow-up visits to medical facilities have been deemed necessary. 4.5 As to the admissibility of the communication, the State party submits that the author’s claim that she risks being subjected to treatment contrary to the Covenant fails to attain the basic level of substantiation required. It considers that the communication is manifestly unfounded and should therefore be held inadmissible pursuant to article 3 of the Optional Protocol and rule 99 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. 4.6 On the merits, the State party notes that in order to find a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, it must be established that if returned, the author would face a real risk of being subjected to the type of treatment that is prohibited in article 7.1 The risk must also be the necessary and foreseeable consequence of the forced return. 2 The Committee’s jurisprudence indicates a high threshold as to the substantial grounds required to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists, such as noted in article 7. All relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. The State party notes that great weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party,3 and that it is generally for the domestic courts to evaluate the facts and evidence, unless the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.4 The State party explains that, as the Swedish Aliens Act reflects the same principles that are contained in article 7 of the Covenant, the Swedish migration authorities apply the same kind of test when considering an asylum application as the Committee. It emphasizes that its migration authorities are in a very good position to assess the information submitted by an asylum seeker and to appraise the credibility of his or her claims. 4.7 The State party notes that in the present case, the Migration Agency and the Migration Court thoroughly examined the author’s claims. The Migration Agency held an introductory interview with the author on 19 November 2014. The minutes of the interview were communicated to the author’s counsel on 19 March 2015. On 29 June 2015, the author was again interviewed for about two hours in the presence of her counsel. The minutes of that interview were communicated to the author’s counsel on 1 July 2015. During both interviews, interpreters were present and the author confirmed that she understood them well. Through her counsel, the author has been invited to submit written observations on the aforementioned minutes, and to make written appeals. The author had several opportunities to explain the relevant facts and circumstances in support of her claim and to argue her case before the Migration Agency and the Migration Court. Both the Migration Agency and the Migration Court had sufficient information to ensure that they had a solid basis for making a well-informed, transparent and reasonable risk assessment concerning the author’s need for protection. In view of the foregoing and the fact that the Migration Agency and the Migration Court are specialized bodies with expertise in asylum law and practice, the State party finds no reason to conclude that their findings were inadequate or arbitrary, or amounted to a denial of justice. 4.8 As regards the author’s risk of torture or other ill-treatment upon her return to Somalia, the State party submits that the risk must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The author should substantiate her claim by presenting an arguable case and establishing that she runs a personal, foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. After an individual assessment, the migration authorities found that the author’s asylum claim contained several contradictory elements and implausible circumstances. The Agency noted that, despite the opportunities she was given to speak freely, the author had provided a vague account that was lacking in detail about the incidents that had allegedly occurred in Somalia. In 1 2 3 4 In this regard, the State party recalls the Committee’s jurisprudence that States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement, as it indicated in its general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, para. 9; A.C. v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/93/D/1494/2006), para. 8.2; and P.K. v. Canada (CCPR/C/89/D/1234/2003), para. 7.2. A.R.J. v. Australia (CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996), paras. 6.6, 6.8 and 6.14. Khan v. Canada (CCPR/C/87/D/1302/2004), para. 5.4. Nakrash and Liu v. Sweden (CCPR/C/94/D/1540/2007), paras. 7.3–7.4; and X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 9.2. 3