CCPR/C/133/D/2619/2015 Advance unedited version entities as well. Accordingly, the Committee is not precluded by article 1 of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication. 6.7 The Committee notes that the State party has not contested that the domestic remedies have been exhausted. Accordingly, the Committee finds that it is not precluded from examining the communication by the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. 6.8 The Committee takes note of the author’s submission that the State party violated its obligations under article 2 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, which indicates that the provisions of article 2 set forth a general obligation for States parties and cannot give rise, when invoked separately, to a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol. 20 Accordingly, it concludes that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.9 The Committee notes the author’s claim that Mr. Statkevich’s rights under article 14 (5) of the Covenant have been violated as the appeal court did not provide any explanation on the reasons why it rejected the appeal and did not examine substantive deficiencies of Mr. Statkevich’s conviction. The Committee notes, however, that the decision of Minsk City Court of 19 July 2011 does not merely refer to the procedural aspects of the hearing performed by the District Court, but to the “information on file”, which indicates that the court did engage in an evaluation of facts and evidence and did not limit the review to points of law only. Accordingly, the Committee finds the author’s claims under article 14 (5) to be insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.21 6.10 The Committee notes the author’s claim that Mr. Statkevich’s rights under article 22 of the Covenant have been violated as Mr. Statkevich was arrested because he exercised his right to freedom of association. In the absence of any other pertinent information on file in that respect, the Committee considers the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate these claims for purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it concludes that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.11 The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated the remaining claims raising issues under article articles 7, 9, 10, 14 (1, 2, 3 (b) (d) (e) (g)), 17, 19, 21, 25 of the Covenant, for purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. The Committee notes that, in failing to respond to a communication, or responding incompletely, a State that is the object of a communication puts itself at a disadvantage, because the Committee is then compelled to consider the communication in the absence of full information relating to the communication. 22 In the absence of any explanations from the State party in respect of the merits, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that they have been sufficiently substantiated.23 7.2 With regard to the author’s claim that Mr. Statkevich was subjected to torture, illtreatment and psychological pressure at the pre-trial detention and investigation stage, with the aim of obtaining a confession, as well as after his conviction, the Committee notes that she provided a detailed description of the methods used, such as emotional and physical abuse by harassment and threats. During the 19 December 2010 crackdown by police special forces, 20 21 22 23 8 See, for example, communications No. 2202/2012, Castañeda v. Mexico, Views adopted on 18 July 2013, para. 6.8; No. 1834/2008, A.P. v. Ukraine, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 23 July 2012, para. 8.5; No. 1887/2009, Peirano Basso v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 19 October 2010, para. 9.4. See, for example, communications No. 2337/2014, Volchek v. Belarus, Views adopted on 23 July 2020, para. 6.7. General comment No. 33 (2008), para. 10. See, for example, communications No. 2455/2014, Reviako v. Belarus, Views adopted on 23 July 2020, para. 8.1