CAT/C/41/D/291/2006 page 11 to place them under an obligation promptly to investigate the allegation.22 In the present case, the complainant was so upset when she appeared before a judge that her appearance suggested she had been abused. She subsequently gave a lawyer instructions to submit a complaint on her behalf, describing the incidents and expressly classing them as torture. Two articles on the brutal treatment inflicted on the complainant were also disseminated. In the complainant’s view, the State party deliberately refused to take any measure that might throw some light on the accusations being made, which amounts to an aggravated violation of the obligation to conduct an investigation under article 12, taken either on its own or in conjunction with article 16, paragraph 1. 3.13 In respect of her allegation under article 13, the complainant notes that the Committee has established that it is sufficient for the victim simply to formulate an allegation of torture to oblige the authorities to investigate the allegation. Neither a formal complaint nor an express statement of intent to institute criminal proceedings is required.23 In the present case, the State party deprived the complainant of any remedy that might have led to ascertaining the facts and setting compensation. 3.14 The complainant claims that she is the victim of a violation of article 14. According to her, the State party denied her right to obtain redress and the means for full rehabilitation, as it prevented her from making use of the legal channels for this purpose. The international courts have consistently held that allegations of torture made against the authorities of a State party are of such seriousness that a civil action alone cannot provide adequate redress.24 Full redress comprises compensation for harm suffered and an obligation on the State party to establish the facts related to the allegations and to punish the perpetrators of the violations.25 By not following 22 Communication No. 6/1990, Henri Unai Parot v. Spain, Views adopted on 2 May 1995, para. 10.4. 23 Communications No. 59/1996, Encarnación Blanco Abad v. Spain, cit., para. 8.6; No. 113/1998, Ristic v. Yugoslavia, Views adopted on 11 May 2001, paras. 9.6-9.8; and No. 6/1990, Henri Unai Parot v. Spain, cit., para. 10.4. 24 Counsel refers to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (communications No. 563/1993, Nydia Erika Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, Views adopted on 27 October 1995, para. 8.2; and No. 778/1997, José Antonio Coronel et al. v. Colombia, Views adopted on 24 October 2002, para. 6.2) and of the European Court of Human Rights (Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1998-VIII; Aydin v. Turkey, Judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997-VI; and Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996-VI). 25 Counsel refers to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (communications No. 749/1997, McTaggart v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 31 March 1998, para. 10; No. 540/1993, Ana Rosario Celis Laureano v. Peru, Views adopted on 25 March 1996, para. 10; and No. 84/1981, Barbata et al. v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 21 October 1982, para. 11).