CAT/C/62/D/702/2015 enforcement officer must defer removal where an individual establishes “a risk of death, extreme sanction or inhuman treatment” that has arisen since the last assessment of risk. 30 When considering an applicant’s request, the enforcement officer does not conduct a full assessment of the alleged risks; rather, the officer considers and assesses risk-related evidence in order to decide whether a deferral of removal is warranted in order to allow for a full assessment of risk (i.e., a new pre-removal risk assessment) to be conducted. Although the complainants submit that the death of Avtar Singh is the reason that they did not present for removal and therefore consider this to be evidence of the risk they would face upon return to India, they did not present this domestically before proceeding with their communication to the Committee. If successful, this remedy would have prevented their removal, pending a full risk assessment. In the event of a negative outcome, they could have applied for judicial review along with a motion for judicial stay of removal pending the disposition of that leave application. No explanation has been provided by the complainants as to why they did not avail themselves of this remedy. 4.15 The State party submits that the provision of new evidence renders the communication inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Committee, on a number of occasions, has expressed the view that new evidence, such as documentary or medical evidence, emerging after domestic processes are concluded must first be subject to domestic review in order to give national authorities the opportunity to examine the evidence. 31 The State party further submits that it is for domestic tribunals, and not the Committee, to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case. Therefore, the Committee should not base its views on evidence the authors failed to put before available and effective domestic processes, which would have been the proper forums. 4.16 The State party avers that the complainants have not sufficiently substantiated, for the purposes of admissibility, any of the allegations that they face a real and personal risk of torture in India such that their removal would violate article 3 of the Convention. Therefore, the communication is also inadmissible on the basis that it is manifestly unfounded, in accordance with rule 113 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. 4.17 The State party submits that in its general comment No. 1 (1997) on article 3, the Committee places the burden on authors to establish that they would be personally at risk. The grounds on which such a claim is based must “go beyond mere theory or suspicion” (para. 6). The allegations must be “sufficiently substantiated and reliable”. 32 Important inconsistencies in the complainant’s case are “pertinent to the Committee’s deliberations as to whether the complainant would be in danger of being tortured upon return”.33 General comment No. 1 also includes as relevant considerations “evidence as to the credibility of the author” and “factual inconsistencies in the claim” (para. 8). In addition, the State party asserts that the Committee should give considerable weight to the findings of fact and conclusions of domestic decision makers, 34 and that it is not within the scope of review by the Committee to re-evaluate findings of fact unless it is manifest that the evaluation was arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 35 4.18 The State party submits that the complainants’ allegations do not warrant any reassessment of the findings and conclusions of the domestic decision makers. Competent and impartial domestic decision makers conducted thorough assessments of the complainants’ allegations of risk and found that they had not substantiated those allegations. The State party further submits that the analysis of the evidence and the conclusions drawn by domestic decision makers, in particular the Refugee Protection Division, were appropriate and well founded and that the complainants have not identified or explained 30 31 32 33 34 35 8 See Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Shpati, judgment of 18 October 2011, paras. 41−45, in which the Court held that, aside from these circumstances, “other personal exigencies have been held to warrant a deferral because removal at that time would not be reasonably practicable” (para. 44). K.K.H. v. Canada (CAT/C/15/D/35/1995). See Aemei v. Switzerland (CAT/C/18/D/34/1995), para. 9.6. See A.K. v. Australia (CAT/C/32/D/148/1999), para. 6.2; and N.P. v. Australia (CAT/C/22/D/106/1998), para. 6.6. See E.L. v. Canada (CAT/C/48/D/370/2009), para. 8.7. See, for example, A.K. v. Australia, para. 6.4.