CAT/OP/MLI/1 7. According to information supplied by the State party, a good number of responses were incomplete or inadequate due to the lack of available statistical data. The Subcommittee regretted in particular the absence of information on incidents of violence among detainees and on complaints, investigation, prosecutions and convictions for acts of torture or ill-treatment. 8. The Subcommittee wishes to thank the liaison officer, Mr. Boubacar Sidiki Samaké, technical adviser at the Ministry of Justice, and the authorities for their help during the visit, especially in providing the official authorizations requested by the Subcommittee. As a result, in most cases it was easy to gain access to places of deprivation of liberty. 9. In general, the Subcommittee was able to visit prisons and undertake its work in a satisfactory manner, notably through fully confidential private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty, although an abnormally high number of detainees refused to meet with the Subcommittee. In two specific cases, however, access was refused to cells of the State security service in Bamako, on 7 December, and to cells in Bamako Central Prison during attempted follow-up visits on 13 and 14 December, despite the efforts of the liaison officer and the insistence of the Subcommittee. 10. During the first two visits to Bamako Central Prison, on 6 and 7 December, the prison authorities had attempted to hide the reality of conditions and to prevent the Subcommittee members from meeting with all the detainees and interviewing them. Certain detainees were moved from the prison after the first visit to prevent the Subcommittee from interviewing them the following day, as had been arranged in agreement with the prison management. A list of these detainees was requested but, despite the Subcommittee’s strong insistence, it was not provided by the prison management, which was also unable to convincingly explain the transfer of the detainees or why a list of those who had been transferred could not be made available. Such behaviour is a serious matter and is a breach of the obligations under the Optional Protocol. 11. The Subcommittee also notes that the Government of Mali has not responded to its preliminary confidential observations, even prior to the period of instability following the coup d’état. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee hopes to be able to continue its dialogue with the State party on the issues raised and the recommendations put forward in the present report. 12. The Subcommittee considers it highly desirable that in future the authorities take the necessary measures to enable the Subcommittee to carry out its mandate in full, in line with the international obligations freely undertaken by the State party. III. National preventive mechanism 13. The Subcommittee takes note of the establishment of a national preventive mechanism but expresses its concern that the State party has assigned this function to the National Human Rights Commission in the circumstances observed by the delegation. The Subcommittee considers the present structure to be unsatisfactory, particularly due to its lack of independence and the absence of funding. 14. Under article 18 of the Optional Protocol, States Parties are required to guarantee the functional independence of national preventive mechanisms and their personnel. They undertake to provide for and make available the necessary resources for the functioning of the national preventive mechanisms in accordance with the Paris Principles. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee noted that the structure of the national preventive mechanism in Mali did not allow it to act independently, free of interference from the State authorities, particularly the prison authorities and the police. Indeed, the national preventive mechanism’s 4 GE.14-41827