- 17 - CDL-AD(2006)009 Egypt resorted to consistent and widespread use of torture against prisoners, and therefore that the complainant was at a real risk of torture. In the opinion of the Committee, the procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, had no effective mechanism for enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this risk38. 71. In the Mamatkulov case, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that assurances leading to extradition/deportation can take away the real risk of torture, even when the follow-up procedures were not extensive39. However, the assessment of diplomatic assurances in this case should not be overestimated. The Court merely took “formal cognizance of the diplomatic notes from the Uzbek authorities that have been produced by the Turkish Government”40. Moreover, there was no substantiated evidence in the individual case that the people in question had in fact been tortured. Finally, according to the European Court of Human Rights, the existence of the risk must be assessed “primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the expulsion.”41 d. Derogations 72. Under Article 15 ECHR, a Contracting State may derogate from certain of its obligations under the ECHR “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Among these “derogable” obligations are also those laid down in Articles 5 and 6; but, under paragraph 2 of Article 15, not those laid down in Articles 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 742. However, a State may apply Article 15 only if and to the extent that a war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation presents itself in that very same State, and the derogating measures are “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” and “are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”. When such a situation pertains, it is imperative for the State in question to make a formal derogation under Article 15 ECHR43. Moreover, in case of such derogation, the third paragraph of Article 15 requires that the State concerned keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures that it has taken and the reasons therefore. 73. Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is expressed in terms very similar to those of article 15(1)44. 38 Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, Decision CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 24 May 2005. 39 European Court of Human Rights, Mamatkulov and Askerov v. Turkey judgment [GC] of 4 February 2005. 40 European Court of Human Rights, Mamatkulov and Askerov judgment, § 76 41 European Court of Human Rights, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden judgment of 20 March 1991, § 75, Mamatkulov and Askerov judgment, § 69; Vilvarajah and others v. UK judgment of 30 October 1991, § 107. 42 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Aksoy v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 1996, § 62. 43 See European Court of Human Rights, Isayeva v. Russian Federation judgment of 24 February 2005, § 191; ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 127 (“The Court notes that the derogation so notified concerns only Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which deals with the right to liberty and security of person and lays down the rules applicable in cases of arrest or detention. The other Articles of the Covenant therefore remain applicable not only on Israeli territory, but also on the Occupied Palestinian Territory”). 44 Article 4(1) ICCPR has led to the formulation by the United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, of the so-called Siracusa Principles