penalties attributable to the offences for which the author was incarcerated had been reduced, after he committed them, the said provision was not apphcable in his case. 3.2 The author maintained that, as a resuh, domestic remedies had been exhausted. He also stated that he had not applied to any other international body. He requested the Committee to find that he was entitled to receive credit, as partial completion of his combined terms of imprisonment, for the time spent by him on parole, namely 1,292 days, between 31 May 1971 and 13 December 1974. 4. By its decision of 7 August 1979 the Human Rights Committee transmitted the communication under rule 91 of the provisional rules of procedure to the State party concerned, requesting information and observations relevant to the question of admissibihty of the communication. 5. By a note dated 24 March 1980 the State party objected to the admissibility of the communication on the ground that the communication was incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant and as such inad­ missible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. The State party submitted, in particular, that the word "penalty" in article 15 of the Covenant re­ ferred to the punishment or sanction decreed by law for a particular offence at the time of its commission. Therefore, in respect of a particular criminal act, a breach of the right to a lesser penahy could only occur when there was a reduction of the punishment which could be imposed by a court. Parole was the authority granted by law for an inmate to be at liberty during his term of imprisonment; it did not reduce the punishment which, according to law, could be imposed for a given offence, but rather dealt with the way a sentence would be served. The State party further maintained that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1977 did not reduce the penalty which the law decreed for any given criminal offence and that, therefore, the new provisions did not result in a "lighter penalty" within the meaning of article 15 of the Cov­ enant. therefore the provisions of the Criminal Law Amend­ ment Act 1977, if apphed to his case, would result in a lighter penalty. 6.2 Discussing apphcable principles of interpreta­ tion it was submitted that, in case of doubt, a presump­ tion in favour of the hberty of the individual should be applied to article 15 (1). As a consequence, this provi­ sion—unlike the Canadian Interpretation Act, section 36—was said not to be hmited to a penalty imposed or adjudged after the change in the law. In this connection it was argued that this meaning was assumed in reserva­ tions made by certain other States parties when they ratified the Covenant, and was also supported in the proceedings in the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations in I960, in which Canada had participated. 7. By its decision of 25 July 1980 the Committee, after finding, inter alia, that the communication was not incompatible whh the provisions of the Covenant, declared the communication admissible. 8.1 In hs submission under article 4 (2) of the Op­ tional Protocol, dated 18 February 1981, the State party sets out, inter alia, the law relating to the Canadian parole system and asserts that it is not in breach of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It contends: {a) That article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deals only with criminal penakies imposed by a criminal court for a particular criminal offence, pursuant to criminal proceedings; ф) That the forfeiture of parole is not a criminal penalty within the meaning of article 15 of the Cov­ enant; (c) That by replacing forfeiture of parole by revoca­ tion of parole it did not substitute a "lighter penalty" for the "corrimission of an indictable offence while on parole". 8.2 The State party further elaborates on the defini­ tion of the word "penalty" as used in article 15 (1) of the Covenant. 8.3 The State party submits that there are various kinds of penalties: these may be criminal, civil or ad­ ministrative. This distinction between criminal penalties and administrative or disciphnary ones, the State party argues, is generally accepted. Criminal penalties, it fur­ ther submits, are sometimes referred to as "formal punishment" whüe the administrative penalties are referred to as "informal punishment". 6.1 On 17 April 1980, comments on behalf of the author of the communication were submitted in reply to the State party's submission of 24 March 1980. They refuted the State party's contention that the granting of parole did not come within the legal term of "penahy" and that the provisions of the Criminal Law Amend­ ment Act 1977 did not result in a "hghter penalty". Discussing a wide range of meanings of the word "penalty", the submission referred to several laws enacted in Canada which, by way of legal interpreta­ tions and judicial decisions, did not permit the State party's conclusion that a punishment not imposed by a court is not a penalty. The author further claimed that, according to Canadian Court rulings in specific cases, it was not unjustifiable to conclude that automatic deprivation of "statutory remission" (apphcation of forfeiture of parole) by operation of law, ahhough without any court order, was a penalty and that 8.4 The State party adds that the setting or context of article 15 of the Covenant is criminal law. The words "guilty", "criminal offence" and "offender" are evidence that when the word "penalty" is used in the context of article 15, what is meant is "criminal penalty". The State party finds unacceptable Mr. Van Duzen's proposition, that the word "penalty" in article 15 of the Covenant must be given a wide construction which would mean that article 15 would apply to ad­ ministrative or disciplinary sanctions imposed by law as a consequence of criminal convictions. 119