5. The Commhtee found, on the basis of the infor­ mation before it, that it was not precluded from con­ sidering the communication by article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol. As to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the parties agreed that there were no further domestic remedies which the alleged victim could pur­ sue. Accordingly, the Committee found that the com­ munication was not inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 6. On 29 July 1980, the Human Rights Committee therefore decided: (а) That the communication was admissible; (б) That, in accordance with article 4 (2) of the Op­ tional Protocol, the State party be requested to submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by it. 7.1 In its submission under article 4 (2) of the Op­ tional Protocol, dated 17 February 1981, the State party reiterated that article 14 (5) of the Covenant establishes the general principle of review by a higher tribunal without making such a review mandatory in all possible cases involving a criminal offence since the phrase "ac­ cording to the law" leaves it to national law to deter­ mine in which cases and circumstances application may be made to a higher court. It explained that under the legal régime in force in Colombia, criminal offences are divided into two categories, namely delitos and con­ travenciones and that convictions for all delitos and for almost all contravenciones are subject to review by a higher court. It added that Consuelo Salgar de Montejo committed a contravención which the applicable legal instrument, namely Decree No. 1923 of 1978, did not make subject to review by a higher court. 7.2 The State party submhs that Decree No. 1923 of 6 September 1978 establishing rules for the protection of the life, honour and property of persons and guarantee­ ing the security of members of associations, known as the "Security Statute", has as its legal basis article 121 of the Colombian Constitution. The decree was issued because of the social situation created by the activities of subversive organizations which were disturbing public order with a view to undermining the democratic system in force in Colombia. The State party adds that this Decree does not affect people's normal peaceful ac­ tivities; it does not restrict pohtical rights, which in Col­ ombia are exercised with total freedom; its objective is to punish offences and it does not differ in nature from any ordinary penal code. 7.3 The State party further submits that the exten­ sion of the jurisdiction of the mihtary criminal courts to the trial of certain offences and of civihans who are not serving in the armed forces, in situations where public order is seriously disturbed, is not a novel feature of the Colombian legal order, and it cited several decrees to il­ lustrate this point. 7.4 As to the allegation that article 7 of Decree No. 1923 of 1978, which estabhshes grounds for deprivation of liberty, violates the guarantee established in article 9 of the Covenant that "no one shah be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are estabhshed by law", the State party argues that the grounds for deprivation of liberty and the procedure to be followed in such a case may be specified in Colombia not only by virtue of an ordinary law of the Congress but also by legislative decrees issued under powers granted by article 121 of the Constitution. These decrees are mandatory and prevail over any legislative provision inconsistent therewith for as long as the state of siege during which they were issued remains in effect. The State party further observes that Decree No. 1923 of 1978 was issued by the President of Colom­ bia in exercise of the powers vested in him by article 121 of the Constitution, and that by its ruling of 30 October 1978 the Supreme Court of Justice declared the Decree to be enforceable, i.e., in conformity whh the Constitu­ tion, with the exception of certain provisions which are consequently no longer in force (these provisions are not relevant to the present case). 7.5 The State party further observes that there are no grounds for claiming that the judicial powers pro­ vided for in articles 9, 11 and 12 of Decree No. 1923 im­ pair the guarantee of a competent, independent and im­ partial tribunal. It quotes the Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia, which has ruled that "... under article 61 of the Constitution it is permissible, during a state of siege, to enlarge the military penal jurisdiction so that it may deal with ordinary offences connected with the disturbance of order or with the causes of the excep­ tional situation. As mihtary tribunals, like ordinary courts, are established by the Constitution, the mere transfer of competence from the ordinary courts to the military tribunals for the hearing, under military judicial procedure, of certain ordinary offences in times of state of siege does not imply that ad hoc courts are estabhshed nor does it mean that the accused are sub­ jected to new rules of procedure, as these rules are em­ bodied in pre-existing law. The military tribunals' com­ petence is extended by authority of the Constitution for the purpose of trying ordinary offences". 7.6 The State party concludes that Consuelo Salgar de Montejo was tried by the authority with exclusive competence in the matter under the legal rules in force, and no other judge or court could legally have tried her for the offence of which she was accused, in view of the time when the offence was committed and she was brought to trial. She was tried in accordance with legal provisions existing prior to the criminal offence she committed, by the competent authority and with full observance of the appropriate procedures for the action brought against her. The State party rejects as totally baseless the allegation that Consuelo Salgar de Montejo was tried twice for the same offence. It maintains that she was tried only once for the offence in question. 8.1 In her additional information and observations dated 7 April 1981 (submitted under rule 93 (3) of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure), the author argues that article 14 (5) of the Covenant provides for dual jurisdiction for judgements in criminal cases and, therefore, the Government of Colombia cannot restrict that guarantee, particularly not by means of emergency 128