sentenced Martha Isabel Valderrama Becerra to six years' rigorous imprisonment and interdiction of public rights and functions for the offence of rebelhon. The judgement states: "In conclusion, the sentences to be passed on the accused who have been declared guilty of the offence of 'rebellion' shall be those contained in ar­ ticle 2 of Decree No. 1923 of 6 September 1978, known as the Statute of Security". In October 1980, the Higher Military Tribunal upheld the sentences of the court of first instance. bitrary arrest and detention. The author argues on the one hand that in the present state of law in Colombia it would be of no avail to pursue domestic remedies for compensation or damages for arbitrary arrest or deten­ tion under Decree No. 1923, since the Decree has been declared constitutional. On the other hand he argues that, notwithstanding this being the state of domestic law, Decree No. 1923 is nevertheless contrary to the rights set out in article 9 of the Covenant to such an ex­ tent that its application to an individual makes him a victim of arbitrary arrest and detention. The Com­ mittee, however, must limit its findings to an assessment as to whether the measures in question have denied the alleged victims the rights guaranteed by article 9 of the Covenant. In the case before it the Committee cannot conclude that the arrest and detention of the alleged vic­ tims were unlawful. It has therefore not been estab­ lished that the application of Decree No. 1923 has led to arbitrary arrest and detention of the alleged victims, within the meaning of the provisions of article 9 of the Covenant. 13.1 In formulating its views, the Human Rights Committee also takes into account the following con­ siderations: 13.2 The Committee notes that the Government of Colombia in its submission of 30 April 1980 made reference to a situation of disturbed pubhc order in Col­ ombia within the meaning of article 4, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. In hs note of 18 July 1980 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (reproduced in document CCPR/C/2/Add.4), which was designed to comply with the formal requirements laid down in ar­ ticle 4 (3) of the Covenant, the Government of Colom­ bia has made reference to the existence of a state of siege in ah the national territory since 1976 and to the necesshy to adopt extraordinary measures within the framework of the legal régime provided for in the Na­ tional Constitution for such situations. With regard to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant, the Government of Colombia declared that "temporary measures have been adopted that have the effect of limiting the ap­ phcation of article 19, paragraph 2, and article 21 of that Covenant". The present case, however, is not con­ cerned with article 19 and article 21 of the Covenant. 13.5 The State party has not commented on the author's further allegations (introduced by him on 30 September 1981) that Justo Germán Bermudez and Martha Isabel Valderrama are also victims of violations of the provisions of article 15 of the Covenant. The Committee holds that it was not the State party's duty to address these allegations, as they were only intro­ duced after the communication had been declared admissible, in regard to alleged breaches of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant. The shence of the State party cannot, therefore, be held against it. The Committee has, however, ex officio, considered these new allega­ tions and finds them ih founded. Justo Germán Bermudez and Martha Isabel Valderrama were tried and convicted for offences which were found by the judge­ ment of 3 April 1979 to constitute a course of action which continued after Decree No. 1923 had entered into force. On the other hand, the author has not shown that those offences, which included assaults on banks, would have come within the scope of the new article 125 of the Colombian Penal Code. The Committee observes, fur­ thermore, that the new law entered into force after Justo Germán Bermudez and Martha Isabel Valderrama had been convicted and their appeal had been rejected. 13.3 The allegations as to breaches of the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant concerning judicial guarantees and fair trial, seem to be based on the premise that civilians may not be subject to military penal procedures and that when civilians are never­ theless subjected to such procedures, they are in effect deprived of basic judicial guarantees aimed at ensuring fair trial, which guarantees would be afforded to them under the normal court system, because military courts are neither competent, independent and impartial. The arguments of the author in substantiation of these allegations are set out in general terms and principally hnked with the question of constitutionality of Decree No. 1923. He does not, however, cite any specific in­ cidents or facts in support of his allegations of disregard for the judicial guarantees provided for by article 14 in the application of Decree No. 1923 in the cases in ques­ tion. Since the Committee does not deal with questions of constitutionality, but whh the question whether a law is in conformity with the Covenant, as applied in the cir­ cumstances of this case, the Committee cannot make any finding of breaches of article 14 of the Covenant. 13.6 The facts as reflected in the information before the Human Rights Committee do not reveal that Justo Germán Bermudez and Martha Isabel Valderrama are victims of violations of rights protected by the Cov­ enant. 14. The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is therefore of the view that the facts as set out in paragraphs 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4 above disclose violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly of: Article 9 (3), because Maria Cristina Salazar de Fais Borda's right to be tried or released within reasonable time was not respected; Article 9 (4), because Orlando Fais Borda and María Cristina Salazar de Fais Borda could not themselves 13.4 As to the ahegations of breaches of the provi­ sions of article 9 of the Covenant, it has been estab­ hshed that the alleged victims did not have recourse to habeas corpus. Other issues are in dispute; in particular, whether the alleged victims were in fact subjected to ar­ 144