в and her son are not subject to Canadian jurisdiction. In substantiation of its refutation of breaches of articles 12, 17, 23 and 26 of the Covenant, the State party sub­ mits the following: that no breach of article 12 exists since В is neither a Canadian citizen nor a permanent resident of that country and therefore was not "ar­ bitrarily deprived of the right to enter [her] own coun­ try". As regards article 17, which prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with the family by the State, it is argued that this article should be interpreted primarily as negative and therefore could not refer to an obliga­ tion by the State positively to re-establish conditions of family Ufe already impaired. As regards article 23, which provides for the entitlement of the family to pro­ tection by the State, it is claimed that such protection re­ quires a priori that an effective family life be­ tween the members of the family must have existed; it could not be concluded that В and her son had shared an effective family life with A. S., since B, after being adopted by A. S. in 1959, lived with her in Canada for two years only, whereafter she left the country in 1961 to return to Poland, where she married and had a son. The fact that A. S. and В have been living apart for 17 years clearly demonstrates that a prolonged family life does not exist and that therefore no breach of article 23 could be claimed by the author. A. S.'s allegation that her daughter was refused an immigration visa because she did not have a profession and that this constituted a violation of article 26 of the Covenant, which provides equal protection of the law without any discrimination, is refuted on the ground that the Canadian immigration regulations do not contain any such discrimination. 6. No comments on the submission of the State party have been received from the author. 7. In order to substantiate her claim under the Cov­ enant and the Optional Protocol, the author must show that one of the provisions of the Covenant has been violated in her case. The only articles of the Covenant which, in the Committee's view, might be relevant to the consideration of her complaint are articles 12, 17, 23 and 26. 8.1 After careful examination of all the material before it, the Human Rights Committee is unable to conclude that articles 12, 17, 23 and 26 of the Interna­ tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are applicable in the case. 8.2 The Human Rights Committee bases its conclu­ sions on the following facts: (а) Article 12 states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country; В and her son are Polish nationals; the provisions of article 12 therefore do not apply in this case; (б) Articles 17 and 23 provide that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his family and that the family is entitled to protection by the State; these articles are not applicable since, except for a brief period of 2 years some 17 years ago, A. S. and her adopted daughter have not lived together as a family; (c) Article 26 provides that all persons are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law; В was denied entry into Canada in conformity with the provisions of existing Canadian law, the ap­ plication of which did not in the circumstances of the present case give rise to any question of discrimination on any of the grounds referred to in the Covenant. 5.2 The State party further refers to A. S.'s pur­ ported willingness to purchase a confectionery store and to offer employment to her daughter and argues that if such employment had existed, and had not only been in­ tended, the Canadian immigration authorities could have examined the existing employment and, if it met the conditions laid down in the Immigration Regula­ tions, 1978, could have certified it as "arranged" employment. In this case A. S.'s daughter would have been granted an immigrant visa. Willingness to create employment could not be substituted for existing employment. 9. Since, for the reasons stated above, the author's claims do not come within the scope of protection of the Covenant, the communication is "incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant" within the meaning of article 3 of the Optional Protocol. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: The communication is inadmissible. Communication No. 81/1980 Submitted by: K. L. on 23 December 1980 Alleged victim: The author Stute party: Denmark Date of decision on inadmissibility: 27 March 1981 (twelfth session) Lack of effective remedy—Unsubstantiated December 1980 in three civil cases concerning the author, upholding the decisions of the lower court in the cases in question, constitute a breach by the Supreme Court of article 2 (3) (a), (Z?) and (c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The author re­ quests the Human Rights Committee to so confirm and to prevail upon the State party to grant a judicial remedy to the author by way of reopening the three allegations Articles of Covenant: 2 (3) and 14 (1) Article of Optional Protocol: 3 The author of the communication, dated 23 December 1980, K. L., Denmark, complains that deci­ sions of the Supreme Court of Denmark, given on 12 28