they are civilians, and this clearly explains why Mr. Torres Ramirez, who was arrested for presumed sub­ versive activities, was placed under their jurisdiction; (v) The body of provisions which constitute the military codes (Military Penal Code, Code on the Organization of the Military Courts and Code of Military Penal Procedure) define in detail the scope of action of the various organs of the military courts in such a way that the exercise of the jurisdictional func­ tion is hedged about by complete guarantees. the submission of its explanations or statements under article 4 (2) of the Optional Protocol had expired on 28 March 1979 and requested the State party to submit, not later than six weeks from the date of the transmittal of this decision to the State party, observations concerning the substance of the matter under consideration, in­ cluding copies of any court orders on decisions of relevance to the matter under consideration. 11. The Committee's decision of 18 April 1979 was transmitted to the State party on 18 May 1979. The six weeks referred to therein therefore expired on 2 July 1979. More than three months after that date a further submission, dated 11 October 1979, was received from the State party. 13. The Committee has considered the present com­ munication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 14. With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee has been informed by the Government of Uruguay in another case (No. 9/1977) that the remedy of habeas corpus is not applicable to persons arrested under the "prompt security measures". Mr. Torres Ramirez stated that he could not avail himself of any other judicial remedy because he was never put on trial. There is no evidence from which the Committee can conclude that there was any other domestic remedy available to him which he should have exhausted. 12. In its further submission of 11 October 1979 the State party while repeating the views expressed in its submission of 14 April 1978, namely that the question of admissibility should be reviewed by the Committee in the light of the explanations given by the State party on domestic procedures available to the accused and reaf­ firming its conviction that its reply of 14 April 1978 should have been sufficient to settle the matter once and for ah, added the following explanations: Mr. Ramirez was arrested on 6 December 1975 and detained under the "prompt security measures" for presumed connection with subversive activities. The case was taken over by the Mihtary Presiding Judge of first sitting. 15. The Committee therefore decides to base its views on the following facts which have either been essentially confirmed by the State party or are un­ contested except for denials of a general character offer­ ing no particular information or explanation: Wihiam Torres Ramirez was arrested on 6 December 1975. He was brought before a mihtary judge in February 1976 and again on 24 June 1976 when an order was issued for his release subject to appearance at a later date. He was however kept in detention until 6 August 1976. During his detention he did not have access to legal counsel. He had no legal possibility to apply for habeas corpus. On 24 June 1976, an order was issued for his release subject to appearance at a later date, and on 3 August 1976 the proceedings relating to his case were closed. On 21 October 1976, he took refuge in the Mexican embassy, and left for that country one week later. As to the accusations of supposed violations of the Covenant, the State party claimed that they were groundless, irresponsible and entirely unproved and, by way of example, submitted the following information as an invalidation of the falsehoods: (i) In Uruguay, physical coercion is expressly pro­ hibited by article 26 of the Constitution and article 7 of Act No. 14,068 and any official who exceeds his powers and assaults a human being is criminally and civilly liable, incurs administrative responsibility and is subject to dismissal; (n) In Uruguay, there are no crimes of opinion and no persons are arrested for their ideas, but a person who invokes a philosophy or ideology which is revolutionary or disruptive of the social order freely estabhshed by the overwhelming majority of the people is and remains a common criminal. This means that the references to ar­ ticles 18 and 19 of the Covenant are totally inap­ propriate; (iii) Administrative detention under the "prompt security measures" does not require the existence of an offence, but simply serious and imminent danger to security and public order; (iv) Act No. 14,068 on the security of the State of 10 July 1972 places under the jurisdiction of the mihtary courts persons who commit military offences, even if 16. As regards the allegations of iU-treatment the Committee notes that in his communication of 13 February 1977, the author named the senior officer responsible for the ill-treatment which he alleged that he received from January 1976 to June 1976. The State party has adduced no evidence that these allegations have been duly investigated in accordance with the laws to which it drew attention in its submission of 11 Oc­ tober 1979. A refutation of these allegations in general terms is not sufficient. The State party should have in­ vestigated the allegations in accordance with its laws and its obligations under the Covenant and the Optional Protocol. 17. The Human Rights Committee has considered whether acts and treatment, which are prima facie not in conformity with the Covenant, could for any reasons be justified under the Covenant in the circumstances. The Government has referred to provisions of Uruguayan law, including the "prompt security measures". However, the Covenant (art. 4) does not allow national measures derogating from any of its provisions except in strictly defined circumstances, and the Government has not made any submissions of fact or law to justify such 51