ducted in writing and without his presence. His right to a defence counsel of his own choice was curtailed, and the judgement of the court was not made public. On 9 October 1979, the Supreme Military Court rendered a judgement of second instance, confirming the judge­ ment of the first instance. The Committee notes that the State party did not comply with the Committee's re­ quest to enclose copies of any court orders or decisions of relevance to the matter under consideration. Pur­ suant to Acta Institucional No. 4 of 1 September 1976, Rosario Pietraroia is deprived of the right to engage in political activities for 15 years. tion. Nevertheless, his morale is high, which accounts for the fact that his physical appearance may seem good. My father is now 68 years old and unless he receives constant and adequate medical attention, I think that his physical condition will be further undermined in view of the harassment and 'accidents' to which he has been and continues to be exposed. 12. The Human Rights Committee notes that it has been informed by the Government of Uruguay in another case (No. 9/1977) that the remedy of habeas corpus is not applicable to persons detained under the ' 'prompt security measures". As regards the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Committee observes that, notwithstanding the fact that an appeal against the judgement of the first instance was pending at the time of the submission of the communication in January 1979 and at the time the communication was declared admissible on 14 August 1979, the State party did not, in its submissions of 13 July 1979 under rule 91 of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure, raise any objection to the admissibility of the communication on that ground and, in any event, that remedy has since been exhausted. As regards the possibihty of invoking the remedies of cassation {"casación") or review {"revisión"), the State party has informed the Commit­ tee in several other cases that these remedies are of an exceptional nature. The Committee is not satisfied that they are applicable in the present case and, in any event, to require resort to them would unreasonably prolong the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 14. The Human Rights Committee has considered whether acts and treatment which are prima facie not in conformity with the Covenant could, for any reasons, be justified under the Covenant in the circumstances. The Government has referred to provisions of Uruguayan law, including the "prompt security measures". The Covenant (art. 4) allows national measures derogating from some of its provisions only in strictly defined circumstances, and the Government has not made any submissions of fact or law to justify such derogation. Moreover, some of the facts referred to above raise issues under provisions from which the Covenant does not allow any derogation under any cir­ cumstances. 15. As regards article 19, the Covenant provides that everyone shah have the right to hold opinions without interference and that the freedom of expression set forth in paragraph 2 of that article shall be subject only to such restrictions as are necessary {a) for respect of the rights and reputations of others or {b) for the protection of national security or of public order {"or­ dre public"), or of pubhc health or morals. The Government of Uruguay has submitted no evidence regarding the nature of the activities in which Rosario Pietraroia was aUeged to have been engaged and which led to his arrest, detention and committal for trial. Bare information from the State party that he was charged with subversive association and conspiracy to violate the Constitution, fohowed by preparatory acts thereto, is not in itself sufficient, without details of the aUeged charges and copies of the court proceedings. The Com­ mittee is therefore unable to conclude on the informa­ tion before it that the arrest, detention and trial of Rosario Pietraroia was justified on any of the grounds mentioned in article 19 (3) of the Covenant. 13.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of aU informa­ tion made available to it by the parties as provided in ar­ ticle 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. It hereby decides to base its views on the following facts, which have either been essentiahy confirmed by the State party, or are un­ contested, except for denials of a general character of­ fering no particular information or explanation: 13.2 Rosario Pietraroia Zapala was arrested in Uruguay, without a warrant for arrest, early in 1976 (ac­ cording to the author on 19 January 1976; according to the State party on 7 March 1976), and held incom­ municado under the "prompt security measures" for four to six months. During the first period of his deten­ tion he was at least on two occasions committed to the military hospital. His trial began on 10 August 1976, when he was charged by a mihtary court with the of­ fences of "subversive association" {"asociación subver­ siva") and "conspiracy to violate the Constitution, fohowed by acts preparatory thereto" {"atentado con­ tra la Constitución en el grado de conspiración seguida de actos preparatorios"). In this connection, the Com­ mittee notes that the Government of Uruguay has of­ fered no explanations as regards the concrete factual basis of the offences for which Rosario Pietraroia was charged in order to refute the claim that he was arrested, charged and convicted on account of his prior political and trade-union activities which had been lawful at the time engaged in. In May 1977, the military prosecutor called for a penalty of 12 years' rigorous imprisonment and on 28 August 1978 Rosario Pietraroia was sen­ tenced to 12 years' imprisonment, in a closed trial, con­ 16. The Human Rights Committee is aware that the sanction of deprivation of certain pohtical rights is pro­ vided for in the legislation of some countries. Ac­ cordingly, article 25 of the Covenant prohibits "unreasonable" restrictions. In no case, however, may a person be subjected to such sanctions solely because of his or her political opinion (arts. 2 (1) and 26). Further­ more, the principle of proportionality would require that a measure as harsh as the deprivation of all political rights for a period of 15 years be specifically justified. No such attempt has been made in the present case. 17. The Human Rights Committee, acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International 79