to López Burgos, including immediate release, permis­ sion to leave Uruguay and compensation for the viola­ tions which he has suffered, and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. such an extent that the very substance of those rights and freedoms would be annihilated; individuals are legally barred from avaihng themselves of the same rights and freedoms with a view to over­ throwing the régime of the rule of law which constitutes the basic philosophy of the Covenant. In the present case, however, the Covenant does not even provide the pretext for a "right" to perpetrate the criminal acts which, according to the Committee's conviction, have been perpetrated by the Uruguayan authorities. APPENDIX T o construe the words "within its territory" pursuant to their strict literal meaning as excluding any responsibility for conduct oc­ curring beyond the national boundaries would, however, lead to ut­ terly absurd results. The formula was intended to take care of o b ­ jective difficukies which might impede the implementation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally unable to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens abroad, having at its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection with their Hmited potential. Instances of occupation of foreign territory offer another example of situations which the drafters of the Covenant had in mind when they confined the obligation of States parties to their own territory. All these fac­ tual patterns have in c o m m o n , however, that they provide plausible grounds for denying the protection of the Covenant. It may be con­ cluded, therefore, that it was the intention of the drafters, whose sovereign decision cannot be challenged, to restrict the territorial scope of the Covenant in view of such situations where enforcing the Covenant would be hkely to encounter exceptional obstacles. Never was it envisaged, however, to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and dehberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens hving abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of article 2 (1), the events which took place outside Uruguay come within the purview of the Covenant. Individual opinion submitted by a member of the Human Rights Committee under rule 94 (3) of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure Communication No. 52/1979 Individual opinion appended to the Committee's views at the re­ quest of Mr. Christian Tomuschat: I concur in the views expressed by the majorhy. None the less, the arguments set out in paragraph 12 for affirming the applicability of the Covenant also with regard to those events which have taken place outside Uruguay need to be clarified and expanded. Indeed, the first sentence in paragraph 12.3, according to which article 2 (1) of the Covenant does not imply that a State party "cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State", is too broadly framed and might therefore give rise to misleading conclusions. In principle, the scope of application of the Covenant is not suscep­ tible to being extended by reference to article 5, a provision de­ signed to cover instances where formally rules under the Covenant seem to legitimize actions which substantially run counter to its pur­ poses and general spirit. Thus, Governments may never use the hmitation clauses supplementing the protected rights and freedoms to Communication No. 56/1979 Submitted by: Lihan Celiberti de Casariego on 17 July 1979 Alleged victim: The author State party: Uruguay Date of adoption of views: 29 July 1981 (thirteenth session) Submission to lACHR—Same matter—Habeas cor­ pus—Arrest in and abduction from another State— Jurisdiction of State party—Arbitrary arrest—Deten­ tion incommunicado—Access to counsel— Procedural delays 2.2 Since 1974 Lihan Cehberti de Casariego, a Uruguayan citizen by birth and of Italian nationality based on jus sanguinis, had been hving in Milan, Italy, with her husband and two children. Mrs. Cehberti had been authorized to leave Uruguay in 1974. While in Uruguay she had been an active member of the Resisten­ cia Obrero-Estudiantil and in this connection she had been arrested for "security reasons", and subsequently released, several times. In 1978 Mrs. Celiberti, her two children (3 and 5 years of age) and Universindo Rodriguez Diaz, a Uruguayan exile hving in Sweden, travelled to Porto Alegre (Brazil) purportedly to contact Uruguayan exiles living there. The author claims that, based on information gathered, inter alia, by represen­ tatives of private international organizations, the Lawyers' Association in Brazil, journahsts, Brazilian parliamentarians and Italian authorities, Mrs. Celiberti was arrested on 12 November 1978 together with her two children and Universindo Rodriguez Diaz in their apartment, in Porto Alegre, by Uruguayan agents with the connivance of two Brazilian police officials (against whom relevant charges have been brought by Brazilian authorities in this connection). From 12 November probably to 19 November 1978, Mrs. Celiberti was de- Articles of Covenant: 2 (1), 5 (1), 9 (1), 10 (1) and 14(3) Articles of Optional Protocol: 1 and 5 (2) (b). Views under articles 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol' 1. The author of the communication (initial letter dated 17 July 1979 and further letters dated 5 and 20 March 1980), is Francesco Cavallaro, practising lawyer in Milan, Italy, acting on behalf of Lilian Celiberti de Casariego, who is imprisoned in Uruguay. The lawyer has submitted a duly authenticated copy of a General Power of Attorney to act on her behalf. 2.1 In his submission of 17 July 1979 the author of the communication alleges the following: ' The text of an individual opinion submitted by a Committee member is appended to these views. 92