in tile possession of United States authorities at that time, was thoroughly inconsistent with the other two. The State party submits that the decision to commit L. P. for extradition was taicen, and reviewed, by com­ petent, independent and impartial tribunals and that this fact has not been challenged by him. The State party further argues that L. P. failed to seek leave to ap­ peal to the Supreme Court of Canada and that he also failed to apply for a writ of habeas corpus to have the legality of his committal adjudicated. Thus, the State party contends, L. P. failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies, as far as his extradition was concerned. (c) Partly concerned with events prior to the date of entry into force of the Covenant for Canada (i.e. incom­ patible ratione temporis); id) Lacking in respect of the requirement set out in article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, to the effect that the alleged victim of a violation must, before sub­ mitting a claim for consideration by the Committee, have exhausted all available domestic remedies. On the basis of the information before it the Human Rights Committee concludes: 1. In so far as L. P. complains about his extradition and alleges violations of articles 13 and 1 (3) of the Covenant, it is not necessary to decide whether any of these provisions might be applicable or whether the facts could be seen to raise issues in that regard, this part of his complaint being inadmissible because the author, by not seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada, failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by article 5 (2) ф) of the Optional Protocol; In respect of L. P.'s claim that he was subjected to illtreatment while in custody in Canada, which claim con­ cerns his confinement in an isolation cell, physical restraint by mechanical means (the use of leg irons) lack of physical exercise and lack of hygienic facilities, the State party submits that two of his three complaints before the appropriate Canadian authorities, filed prior to the entry into force of the Covenant for Canada, namely on 19 February and 15 April 1976, were exam­ ined by these authorities and remedied as far as they were found justified. His third complaint, a court action against the Province of British Columbia, instituted on 6 August 1976, i.e., also before the entry into force of the Covenant for Canada, was never adjudicated, the State party submits, because of failure by L. P. to pur­ sue the action. 2. In so far as the author complains that he was sub­ jected to various forms of mistreatment in violation of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant, it is again not necessary to decide whether the alleged facts could raise any issue under these provisions, this part of his com­ plaint being inadmissible ratione temporis as far as events alleged to have taken place prior to 19 August 1976 are concerned, and, for any later events, being in­ admissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, since he did not pursue the civil action introduced by him, his subsequent extradition from Canada not being a sufficient reason for this failure; In respect of the claim that L. P. was denied the possibihty of preparing the case regarding his extradi­ tion properly, the State party rejects the claim as un­ substantiated and observes that L. P. was afforded privileges going beyond those normally enjoyed by per­ sons detained in prison and that he had numerous visits from his lawyers (including 72 visits from the time the Covenant entered into force, until he was extradited); moreover, it observes that he never made that complaint before the Canadian authorities. 3. In so far as the author also appears to complain that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained, and refers in this respect to article 9(1), again this part of his com­ plaint is inadmissible ratione temporis as far as his ar­ rest and his detention prior to 19 August 1976 are con­ cerned, and with respect to his detention after that date, inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, e.g. by way of habeas corpus proceedings; The Human Rights Committee notes that the infor­ mation and observations furnished by the State party deal both with issues concerning the merits of L. P.'s claims, inasmuch as alleged breaches of the Covenant are concerned, as well as issues of direct relevance to the question of admissibility of his communication under the Optional Protocol. The State party contends that L. P.'s communication should be declared inadmissible under the Optional Protocol because it is: (a) Partly incompatible with the Covenant (i.e. ra­ tione materiae) as concerning matters not covered by it, and partly abusive (on particular grounds referred to by the State party); (b) Partly not directed against Canada (i.e. incom­ patible ratione personae) but in fact against the United States of America; 4. In so far as the author complains under article 14 (3) Ф) of an alleged denial of access to counsel and in­ sufficient time and facilities to prepare his defence, and even assuming that the said provision, or article 13, or any other provision of the Covenant might be аррИсаЫе to extradition proceedings, this complaint is in any event partly inadmissible as being out of time (for the period prior to 19 August 1976) and otherwise for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as it has not been shown that this complaint was ever raised before the competent Canadian authorities. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: The communication is inadmissible. 22