number of occasions resorted to acts wliich he describes as self-defence (in 1978, twice throwing bucketfuls of excrement and urine over cars parked in front of his house, and, in 1979, firing shots from his shotgun in the direction of a group of youngsters across the street and accidentally wounding three of them). In the criminal court proceedings that ensued, the author explained that, in all cases, he had suspected the occupants of the cars and the group of youngsters across the street of be­ ing would-be stone throwers whom he only wanted to scare away. He was, however, found guihy of violating a number of provisions of the penal code, found Hable for damages and sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment, suspended. 4.2 The State party then continues that Should one take the view that a right to self-defence falls within the scope of article 17, it is at any rate clear that the author went too far when exercising this (possible) right. In fact, three children were hit during the shooting incident. Considerable damage was caused to the cars of persons parking for a limited period of time at the bus-stop, in one case without any prior warning from the author. In the court's opinion, he exceeded his right to self-defence, and this must also be the result under article 17 of the Covenant. Norwegian authorities have clearly not interfered with the privacy, home etc., of the author. The main problem in relation to article 17 is therefore whether the authorities have afforded sufficient protection to S. S. against interference by other persons, or, to put it differently, whether Norway has ensured the author the right recognized in article 17 of the Covenant (see article 2 (1) of that instrument). Seen from this angle, the relevant domestic remedies are not in the hands of the courts, but of the various police authorities, which have as their major task to maintain public order and protect the rights of the individual. A person claiming that he has been harassed by others, has to address himself to the police authorities giving them the oppor­ tunity to investigate the matter with a view to preventing similar events in the future. 2.2 The author feels strongly that it is unjust that he has been found guilty and sentenced, as he sees it, merely for trying to defend himself and his property, while the real offenders, i.e, those who for years have been annoying him and damaging his property, have been neither apprehended nor charged. He also feels that a number of procedural errors have been made by the prosecuting authorities and the trial court in the con­ duct of his case. In the countryside, his first possibihty is to inform the sheriff (lensmannen). If he is of the opinion that the sheriff is not pursuing the matter in an efficient manner, he may complain to the police, which will then investigate the matter and ask the sheriff for clarifica­ tions. If the person concerned is still not satisfied, he may complain to the Crown Prosecutor (statsadvokaten) and in the last instance to the Attorney-General (riksadvokaten). Accordingly, a hierarchical system of remedies is available to persons claiming to be subjected to harass­ ment or other criminal acts. 2.3 The author did not initially specify the article or articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which have allegedly been violated by Norway in his case. However, the facts set out in his let­ ter dated 5 September 1980 indicate that he claims to be a victim of violations of the provisions of article 17 of the Covenant. In the case of S. S., it is a matter of clear fact that he never ad­ dressed himself to the police or the Crown Prosecutor because of the alleged harassment .... 4.3 The State party points out in this connection that "the author has not adopted an active attitude towards the poHce authorities" and that apart from the two incidents mentioned in the author's communica­ tion: 2.4 He requests the Human Rights Committee to consider his claim, pointing out that domestic remedies were exhausted by the refusal of the Supreme Court on 31 July 1980 to allow his appeal. He also maintains that other admissibility criteria, set out in the Optional Pro­ tocol, are fulfilled. ... the sheriff's office has never been informed by S. S. of alleged trouble on his property. According to S. S. he has been terrorized for a long time. The remedy open to him was then to report to the sheriff's office, a remedy of which he does not seem to have made ade­ quate use. But at any rate he might have entered into contact with the police or the Crown prosecutor, arguing that he was not satisfactorily protected. As stated above, it is clear that he never did this. 2.5 There is no indication in the communication that the same matter has been submitted to another pro­ cedure of international investigation or settlement. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Norwegian authorities that the author has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him in ac­ cordance with article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 3. By its decision of 27 March 1981, the Human Rights Committee transmitted the communication under rule 91 of the provisional rules of procedure to the State party concerned, requesting information and observations relevant to the question of admissibility of the communication, in so far as it may raise issues under article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 4.4 The State party adds: ... that the sheriff's office in fact kept an eye on S. S.'s house, situated about 6-8 km from the office, as the officers passed the house several times every day. It should also be pointed out that the sheriff's area covers 240 km' with a population of about 6,500. The office has a heavy workload. 4.1 By a note dated 21 October 1981, the State party objected to the competence of the Human Rights Com­ mittee to consider the communication, stating that 5.1 On 16 November 1981, the author of the com­ munication forwarded his comments in reply to the State party's submission of 21 October 1981. if the communication is to be interpreted as alleging a breach of article 17 because S. S., acting in legitimate self-defence, was not acquitted in the criminal proceedings instituted against him, it is the opinion of the Norwegian authorities that the communication should be declared in­ admissible as incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant in ac­ cordance with the provisions of article 3 in fine of the Optional Pro­ tocol. Article 17 provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or cor­ respondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. It does not contain any right to be acquitted because of self-defence. 5.2 The author rejects the State party's contention that the communication does not reveal a violation of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and therefore is inadmissible, stating, in particular, that "it is extremely disheartening and dis­ quieting that the Government should consider that the events and hooliganism ... to which I was subjected for a long time are not covered by article 17. For that mat31