1976 and was detained incommunicado from the date of arrest until August 1976 when he was brought before a judge and formally charged with the offence of "subversive association" and "conspiracy to overthrow the Constitution followed by preparatory acts". It was not until then that he was afforded the right to have the assistance of counsel. He was not allowed to be present at his trial or to defend himself in person. There was no pubhc hearing, and judgement was not delivered in pubhc. On 29 September 1977 he was sentenced by a military court of first instance to 14 years' imprison­ ment. On 17 May 1979 a final judgement was passed by a court of second instance, upholding the previous judgement. He has been deprived of аИ his political rights, including the right to vote, for 15 years. military tribunals are not competent to judge civilian detainees. Since the entry into force of the State Security Act (No. 14,068 of 6 July 1972, approved by Parliament) it has been established that offences against the State come within the jurisdiction of mihtary courts. This Act gives effect to a constitutional norm, article 330, which provides: 'Anyone who takes action to upset the present Constitution, following its adoption and publication, or provides means for such action to be taken, shall be regarded, sentenced and punished as an offender against the State'. Consequently, the sole jurisdiction for these of­ fences is the mihtary, since, from the entry into force of the 1884 Military Penal Code, the duty to safeguard the nation comes specifically within the sphere of military competence. On 29 September 1977 Mr. Tourón was sentenced by a court of first instance to 14 years' imprisonment for "subversive association" (arti­ cle 60 (v) of the Military Penal Code) and "conspiracy to overthrow the Constitution followed by the preparatory acts" (articles 60 (1), paragraph 6, and 60 (XII)) in a combination of principal and secon­ dary offences (Mihtary Penal Code, article 7 and Ordinary Penal Code, article 56). On 10 October 1977 Colonel Otto Gilomen, counsel for the accused, appealed to the Supreme Court of Military Justice against the judgement rendered by the court of first instance. On 17 May 1979 final judgement was passed by a court of second instance, upholding the previous judgement, and it became enforceable o n 29 June 1979. As may be observed, not only did the accused have the benefit of due legal assistance in the proceedings but he availed himself of the remedy of appeal to which Uruguayan legislation en­ titled him. It may be added that under Uruguayan law the remedy of appeal functions automatically in the case of final judgements impos­ ing prison sentences of over three years, such sentences not being con­ sidered enforceable until they have been comprehensively reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Mihtary Justice; in other words, in such cases it is mandatory for counsel to appeal against such sentences. To continue with the erroneous or false assertions, it is stated in the communication that Mr. Touron's case has not been sub­ mitted to any other international body, when in reality it was brought before and considered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as case N o . 2011. With regard to the reference to physical coer­ cion, the Government of Uruguay categorically rejects this accusa­ tion. 9. As to the allegations of ill-treatment, they are in such general terms that the Committee makes no finding in regard to them. 10. The Human Rights Committee has considered whether acts and treatment, which are prima facie not in conformity with the Covenant, could for any reasons be justified under the Covenant, in the circumstances. The Government has referred to provisions of Uruguayan law, including the "prompt security measures". The Covenant (art. 4) ahows national measures derogating from some of its provisions only in strictly defined cir­ cumstances, and the Government has not made any sub­ missions of fact or law to justify such derogation. 11. The Human Rights Committee is aware that under the legislation of many countries criminal of­ fenders may be deprived of certain political rights. However, article 25 of the Covenant permits only reasonable restrictions. The Committee notes that Mr. Tourón has been sentenced to 14 years' imprison­ ment for "subversive association" and "conspiracy to overthrow the Constitution followed by preparatory acts". The State party has not responded to the Com­ mittee's request that it should be furnished with copies of any court orders or decisions relevant to the matter. The Committee is gravely concerned by this omission. Although similar requests have been made in a number of other cases, the Committee has never yet been fur­ nished with the texts of any court decisions. This tends to suggest that judgements, even of extreme gravity, as in the present case, are not handed down in writing. In such circumstances, the Committee feels unable, on the basis of the information before it, to accept either that the proceedings against Luis Tourón amounted to a fair trial or that the severity of the sentence imposed or the deprivation of political rights for 15 years were justified. 6. The Human Rights Committee notes that the State party has informed the Committee in another case (No. 9/1977) that the remedy of habeas corpus is not applicable to persons detained under the "prompt security measures". 7. As to the State party's observation in its note dated 10 July 1980 that the case of Luis Tourón was brought before and considered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as case No. 2011, the Committee recalls that it has already ascertained in con­ nection with its consideration of other communications (e.g. No. 1/1976) that lACHR case No. 2011 (dated 27 January 1976, hsting the names and dates of arrest of a large number of persons, offering no further details), predates the entering into force of the Covenant, and the Optional Protocol for Uruguay, and therefore does not concern the same matter which the Committee is competent to consider. Further, the Committee recalls that no objection was raised by the State party as to the admissibility of the present communication under rule 91 of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure. 12. In addition, the Human Rights Committee act­ ing under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the In­ ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is of the view that the facts as found by the Committee, in so far as they continued or occurred after 23 March 1976 (the date on which the Covenant and the Optional Pro­ tocol entered into force for Uruguay), disclose viola­ tions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular of: 8. The Human Rights Committee, considering the present communication in the light of ah information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol, hereby decides to base its views on the following facts which have either been essentially confirmed by the State party, or are unrefuted: Luis Tourón was arrested on 21 January 62