MAMATKULOV AND ASKAROV v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 35 its own. It considered the indication that had been given in the light of the nature of the proceedings before the Commission and of the Commission's role and concluded: “Where the State has had its attention drawn in this way to the dangers of prejudicing the outcome of the issue then pending before the Commission any subsequent breach of Article 3 ... would have to be seen as aggravated by the failure to comply with the indication” (Cruz Varas and Others, cited above, pp. 36-37, § 103). 119. The Court emphasises in that connection that, unlike the Court and the Committee of Ministers, the Commission had no power to issue a binding decision that a Contracting State had violated the Convention. The Commission's task with regard to the merits was of a preliminary nature and its opinion on whether or not there had been a violation of the Convention was not binding. 120. In Čonka (decision cited above) the Court referred to the argument set out in paragraph 109 above and added: “The Belgian authorities expelled the applicants the same day ..., without giving any reasons for their decision to ignore the measures that had been indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In view of the settled practice of complying with such indications, which are given only in exceptional circumstances, such a manner of proceeding is difficult to reconcile with 'good faith co-operation with the Court in cases where this is considered reasonable and practicable'.” 121. While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, in the interests of legal certainty and foreseeability it should not depart, without good reason, from its own precedents (see, among other authorities, mutatis mutandis, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 70, ECHR 2001-I, and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002-VI). However, it is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. It is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions (see, among other authorities, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 15-16, § 31, and Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 75). 122. Furthermore, the Court would stress that although the Convention right to individual application was originally intended as an optional part of the system of protection, it has over the years become of high importance and is now a key component of the machinery for protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. Under the system in force until 1 November 1998, the Commission only had jurisdiction to hear individual applications if the Contracting Party issued a formal declaration recognising its competence, which it could do for a fixed period. The system of protection as it now operates has, in that regard, been modified by Protocol No. 11, and the right of individual application is no longer dependent on a declaration by the Contracting States. Thus, individuals now