Human Rights of Armed Forces Personnel (EUROMIL), which in May 2020 comprised 32 associations (both professional associations and trade unions) from 22 countries.231 Many states limit the freedom of association of public servants, including armed forces personnel. This difference in treatment compared to workers in other sectors is often justified by the public interest in ensuring that essential public services are not disrupted. It can be argued that service personnel are not workers in a conventional sense in that, when enlisting, they subject themselves to restrictions under a system of military discipline that is far more extensive than the usual control of an employer over an employee. Nevertheless, it is notable that some legal bodies have treated members of the armed services as “workers”.232 Most OSCE participating States prohibit collective action, primarily strikes, by armed forces members. Membership of armed forces personnel in trade unions or other collective representative bodies raises two distinct concerns – discipline and outside influence. The first concern is the question of military discipline and possible interference with the esprit de corps and operational effectiveness. The raising of collective grievances on the part of service personnel has traditionally been seen as equivalent to insubordination, or even the serious military offence of mutiny, due to the perceived impact on the established chain of command. Moreover, collective action could disrupt vital operations in a way that threatens national security. Whether such concerns should impact the ability to discuss and represent issues around conditions of service is clearly open to debate. Associations that focus on working conditions and the socio-professional aspects of military life, as opposed to operational and strategic processes and decisions, have had no discernible impact on operational effectiveness in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden.233 The second concern is related to allegiance and outside influence. In terms of allegiance, members of a union may act collectively on the instruction of union officials, including in taking collective action. This is seen by some as providing a rival source of authority and allegiance to the chain of command, and detrimental to military effectiveness. The objection is all the greater if the union in question is a civilian one or, as in some countries, the trade union movement is historically associated with a particular political party or doctrine, leading to concerns over political neutrality (see “Chapter 5: Civil and Political Rights”). In order to address these concerns in countries where they are permitted, military associations 108 231 EUROMIL was founded in 1972 and represents approximately 500,000 soldiers and their families. It has consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and participatory status at the Council of Europe. See: EUROMIL homepage, http://euromil.org/. 232 In 1999, South Africa’s Constitutional Court found that members of the South African Defence Force were entitled to a constitutional right for “workers” to be members of a trade union, to participate in its activities and to strike. 233 See: Giuseppe Caforio, “Unionization of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel”, in Giuseppe Caforio (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003), pp. 311-322.