Compendium of Standards, Good Practices and Recommendations (including of women in the Norwegian and Swedish cases) has been reintroduced.271 The issue of conscientious objection is not exclusive to states with conscripted armed forces. A conscientious objection may arise at any point during the careers of armed forces personnel and, as such, may also occur in a state with no draft system. This could include, for example, situations where a serviceperson’s religious or other beliefs change. The right to change one’s beliefs is an important component of the freedom of thought, religion and belief. In addition, a person who does not have a general objection to the use of violence or the taking of life may, nevertheless, have a conscientious objection to a particular military campaign that they regard, for example, as immoral or contrary to international law. This is sometimes referred to as “selective conscientious objection” and is discussed later in this chapter. All of these situations raise common concerns. On the one hand, effective protection is needed so that people are not compelled to act against their convictions. On the other, authorities have to be satisfied that the conscientious objection is genuine and not an attempt to evade legal responsibilities. The question of assessing the authenticity of beliefs is by no means unique to conscientious objection, nor is it unresolvable. It arises in many other contexts in which the law recognizes the freedom to act upon different beliefs.272 A state may either take a claim of conscientious objection at face value (particularly where there is little or no other advantage in making insincere claims) or, as many states do, it may establish a formal process for testing the sincerity of an individual’s professed beliefs through an inquiry by some type of panel. Where states recognize conscientious objection to conscription, they generally provide for alternative or substitute service in non-military work for other public authorities, such as healthcare, social services or education. In some cases, the extent to which alternative service is comparable to military service may be questioned. Clearly, if alternative service is perceived as significantly less onerous, then there may be an incentive for insincere claims of conscientious objection. On the other hand, if alternative service is significantly more arduous or timeconsuming, it may be seen as an effort to punish or deter conscientious objectors. It may also be difficult to make a strict comparison between military service and alternative service, because certain features of conscription do not have a civil counterpart, such as the requirement to live in barracks, take part in military exercises or be deployed to the battlefield. There are also issues concerning the practical recognition of conscientious objection. A 2012 report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR), cites the following considerations: 271 Elizabeth Braw, “Bring Back the Draft: No, Really”, Politico, 21 January 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/ bring-back-the-draft-conscription-sweden-scandinavia/. 272 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2013), Chapter 6. 127