Human Rights of Armed Forces Personnel time, that a lack of alternative civilian service to military conscription breached Article 18 of the Covenant.280 Bearing in mind that a large number of states had introduced schemes of alternative service to accommodate conscientious objectors, it found that Korea had not adequately demonstrated why, as it claimed, this was impossible in its case without compromising national security. Accordingly, it could not rely on Article 18(3), which provides that any limitations on the freedom to manifest religion or belief be prescribed by law and “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” That approach, nevertheless, provided the possibility for states to justify a refusal to accommodate conscientious objectors under Article 18(3). This possibility was closed, however, in the later case of Min-KY Jeong et al. v. the Republic of Korea, when the Human Rights Committee, by a majority, found that the complainants’ conviction and sentence for refusing to be drafted amounted to an infringement of their freedom of conscience under Article 18(1), rather than an unjustified restriction on the manifestation of belief.281 Subsequent decisions have confirmed this approach.282 In Jong-nam Kim v. the Republic of Korea, the Human Rights Committee confirmed its view that the imposition of compulsory military service without the option of alternative civilian service deprives individuals of the right to choose whether or not to declare their conscientiously held beliefs. The Committee argued that this would place such persons “under a legal obligation, either to break the law or to act against those beliefs, in a context in which it may be necessary to deprive another human being of life.”283 Council of Europe standards Within the Council of Europe, there has also been a progressive process, leading to the full recognition of the right to conscientious objection by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011. While Article 4 of the ECHR expressly exempts military service or alternative service from being treated as forced labour,284 the ECHR does not refer explicitly to conscientious objection. In a 1966 case against Germany, the European Court of Human Rights found that each contracting state could decide whether or not to grant conscientious exemption 280 UN Human Rights Committee, Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. the Republic of Korea, Communication Nos. 1321/2004 and 1322/2004. 281 UN Human Rights Committee, Min-Kyu Jeong et al v. the Republic of Korea, Communication nos. 16421741/2007. 282 UN Human Rights Committee, Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey, Communication nos. 1853/2008 and 1854/2008. 283 Jong-nam Kim et al v. the Republic of Korea, Communication no. 1787/2008, para 7.3. See also: Young-kwan Kim v. the Republic of Korea, Communication no. 2179/2012. 284 Article 4(3): “For the purpose of this Article, the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall not include: […] (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory military service.” ECHR, op. cit., note 24. See also: ICCPR, op. cit., note 16, Art. 8(3)(c). 130