CCPR/C/130/D/2777/2016 conjunction with article 2 (3) of the Covenant, because the author and his family were subjected to arbitrary and unlawful interference with their privacy, home and family life. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee observes that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol precludes it from considering a communication unless it has been ascertained that domestic remedies have been exhausted. Taking into account the author’s argument that he has exhausted domestic remedies and in the absence of any objection by the State party in this connection, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by the provisions of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining the present communication. In this connection, the Committee notes that, while the author considers that the State party’s allegation that the communication is inadmissible refers to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to article 5 (2) (b), the State party acknowledges in its observation that the case has been examined in three tiers of its judicial system. 6.4 The Committee notes the author’s submission that the State party has violated its obligations under article 2 (2) of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 7, since it failed to adopt effective legislative measures to give effect to the rights enshrined in article 7 of the Covenant and to remove obstacles in the existing legal framework concerning torture. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence indicating that the provisions of article 2 of the Covenant set forth a general obligation for States parties and cannot, when invoked separately, give rise to a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol. 29 The Committee also considers that the provisions of article 2 cannot be invoked as a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the Covenant, except when the failure by the State party to observe its obligations under article 2 (2) is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual claiming to be a victim. The Committee notes, however, that the author has already alleged a violation of his rights under article 7 resulting from the interpretation and application of the existing laws of the State party and the Committee does not consider that examination of whether the State party also violated its general obligations under article 2 (2) of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 7, is distinct from examination of the violation of the author’s rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore considers that the author’s claims in this regard are incompatible with article 2 (2) of the Covenant and inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 The Committee notes the State party’s allegation that the case of the author was already properly addressed and settled in the domestic courts with a judgment to provide compensation to the author pursuant to the Compensation for Torture Act. However, the Committee notes that the author argues that the amount of money awarded as compensation pursuant to the decision of the domestic court is not commensurate with the severity of the torture he was subjected to in March 2006. The Committee also takes note of the author’s allegation that pecuniary compensation alone can never be considered sufficient to provide adequate reparation to a victim of torture and that none of the persons suspected of inflicting the torture was ever identified, tried and punished, despite a number of complaints made by the author regarding the torture that he suffered in March 2006. In this connection, the Committee recalls that reparation should be proportionate to the gravity of the violations 29 10 See Castañeda v. Mexico (CCPR/C/108/D/2202/2012), para. 6.8; A.P. v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/105/D/1834/2008), para. 8.5; and Peirano Basso v. Uruguay (CCPR/C/99/D/1887/2009), para. 9.4.