CCPR/C/126/D/2989/2017 available remedies and that mere doubts or assumptions about their effectiveness do not absolve the authors from exhausting them.5 11.5 At the same time, the Committee notes that the author did pursue domestic remedies in his extradition case and they did have suspensive effect, which made them effective as regards the principal matter of the author’s request for interim measures, i.e. suspension of the extradition. The Committee notes that on 30 May 2017, the author was notified of the Vilnius district administrative court hearing in his extradition case, scheduled for 14 June 2017. On 7 June 2017, the author submitted a request for interim measures to the Committee without mentioning the ongoing expulsion proceedings. That prompted the Committee into issuing an interim measures request prematurely. The postponement of the hearing at the Vilnius district administrative court to 30 August 2017 resulted in the domestic proceedings in the case being protracted. In those circumstances, the intentional concealing of essential information from the Committee by the author, represented by counsel, concerning the domestic remedies available, is viewed by the Committee as an abuse of the right to submission as regards the author’s request for interim measures. 11.6 The Committee further notes that the author’s failure to inform the Committee about the ongoing proceedings in his extradition case led to a suspension of the consideration of his communication until the exhaustion of domestic remedies and to the lifting of the request for interim measures. At present, domestic remedies have been exhausted and the requirement of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have therefore been met. 11.7 The Committee notes the author’s complaint that his rights under articles 7 and 10 (1) of the Covenant will be violated should he be extradited to Belarus, in view of the conditions of detention in SIZO No.1. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the author’s allegations concerning the conditions of detention in Belarus are of a general nature and that the author has failed to indicate any individual risks in order to substantiate his claims. 11.8 The Committee notes that the author invokes both article 7 and article 10 (1) of the Covenant, on the basis of the conditions of detention in Belarus. The Committee notes that although these provisions complement each other, their purpose and scope is not identical. While article 10 (1) deals specifically with persons deprived of their liberty and encompasses for such persons the elements set out in article 7, article 7 concerns serious forms of ill-treatment whereby the individual, including persons deprived of their liberty, is singled out for specific attacks. 6 In the present case, the author has not sufficiently substantiated any individual risk of ill-treatment that would run contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee thus finds his claims under article 7 unsubstantiated and inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 11.9 The Committee further notes that the author’s claims under article 10 (1) relate to general conditions of detention, similar to those of all other detainees, but without providing any evidence or explanation of a specific risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated in article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore finds this claim insufficiently substantiated and inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 11.10 The Committee takes note of the author’s additional claims under articles 2 (3) (1) and (14) (1) of the Covenant that the Lithuanian courts did not properly consider his claims concerning the risk of violation of his rights if he was extradited to Belarus and thus failed to provide him with an effective remedy in his extradition case. The Committee recalls that, even when decided by a court, the consideration of an extradition request does not amount to the determination of a criminal charge7 or fall within the ambit of a determination of 5 6 7 8 See, inter alia, V.S. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/115/D/2072/2011), para. 6.3; García Perea v. Spain (CCPR/C/95/D/1511/2006), para. 6.2; Zsolt Vargay v. Canada (CCPR/C/96/D/1639/2007), para. 7.3; and S.C. v. Australia (CCPR/C/124/D/2296/2013), para. 7.8. See Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998), paras. 7.7 and 7.8, and Weerawansa v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/95/D/1406/2005), para. 7.4. See also Bobrov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/122/D/2181/2012), separate opinion of Committee members Christof Heyns and José Manuel Santos Pais, para. 7. See Everett v. Spain (CCPR/C/81/D/961/2000), para. 6.4.