CEDAW/C/55/D/35/2011 during her asylum proceedings that she fled Burundi owing to political persecution, and that she had been raped by three men while fleeing, should be sufficient for the State party to consider rape to be a form of discrimination against women and gender-related persecution, whether alone or intersecting with alleged political persecution. The author should not be required to make explicit reference to rape as a form of discrimination against women but to raise the substance of her claim, which is what she did. Sexual violence and rape is universally accepted as a form of gender-based violence against women and a form of discrimination against women falling under article 1 of the Convention, as elaborated in the Committee’s general recommendation No. 19, which has clearly placed violence against women within the ambit of discrimination against women by stating that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination against women and includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. 5. In fact, for the purpose of admissibility, the author needs to sufficiently substantiate that she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). She did this by explaining facts relating to her political persecution as a member of the Front national de libération (FNL), the opposition party, whose members were expelled and killed; that her home town, where many FNL members lived, was bombarded by the Government of Burundi (see para. 4.2); that she was raped by three men armed with knives while she was fleeing; and that she was unable to seek justice because the attack by government forces. 6. Furthermore, the State party also submitted that it assessed and rejected “the author’s argument that the State party recognizes only political persecution against men” (para. 6.4.). This claim of the author and the assessment of the State party present clear evidence that the author raised in substance a claim of sex-based discrimination relating to political persecution at the national level. 7. Consequently, the State party’s authorities had an opportunity to consider sexbased discrimination with regard to political persecution and to rape as a form of sexual violence that is recognized as a form of gender-related persecution and as a form of discrimination against women, together or separately. Accordingly, I find the present communication admissible under article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8. I support the Committee’s findings on the admissibility ratione loci with regard to article 2 of the Optional Protocol (paras. 8.5-8.8). In addition, I find it also admissible ratione materiae under article 4 (2)(b). This case is also admissible under articles 4 (2)(c) and 4 (2)(d), given that it is compatible with the provision of the Convention that addresses sex-based or gender-based discrimination. In the present case, I find that the author has sufficiently substantiated her allegations for the purpose of admissibility. 9. With regard to violations of articles 1, 2 (c), 2 (d) and 3 of the Convention, I find violations of articles 2 (c) and 2 (d), in conjunction with articles 1 and 3, by the State party. Article 2 (c) establishes a positive duty of States parties to ensure the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination, while article 2 (d) requires States parties to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination during the entire asylum process. This applies in respect of both the substantive analysis and application of the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and of the Refugee 13-43086 17/20