CAT/C/31/D/210/2002 Page 6 party’s view, the simple fact that the complainant disagrees with the conclusion of the opinion does not alter this. 4.10 In setting aside the complainant’s allegations of having been previously tortured, the Refugee Board did not consider the complainant’s statement credible or substantiated. The same is said to be true of the complainant’s wife’s statement, in respect of which the Board found that despite repeated questioning she was only able to explain about the reason for the final decision on the departure in general terms. The State party also refers to the fact that several instances concerning statements of the complainant and his wife were not very convincing. By way of example, the State party refers to a memorandum of 26 November 2001 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is mentioned in the Refugee Board decision. The Ministry had been requested to comment on the authenticity of the transcript of a judgment dated January 1996, allegedly against the complainant. Although it could not establish whether the judgment was authentic, it found that certain issues in the transcript were extraordinary. There was no reference to the underlying criminal provisions, the punishment imposed was meted out in parts of a year as opposed to whole years, which is unusual, and the punishment imposed was imprisonment and not work camp, which would have been normal in a case like this one. The State party also refers to the complainant’s allegation, in the context of his request to the Board to reconsider his case, that his wife had been subjected to torture and that she had flashbacks during the Board hearing as one of the Board members reminded her of a Russian police officer. The Board noted that the complainant’s wife did not appear to the board as a person “in shock” during the hearing and that this argument could not lead to a reversal of its decision. 4.11 The State party refers to the Refugee Board’s statement that it would not entirely reject the complainant’s statement to the effect that the complainant had carried out activities for the Citizens’ Union, that he had certain conflicts with the authorities, and that his home had been searched. However, the State party argues that it follows from the practice of the Committee that “a risk of being detained as such is not sufficient to trigger the protection of article 3 of the Convention”.4 4.12 In addition, the State party argues that the complainant has not substantiated that he is wanted by the authorities in his country of origin and risks being arrested if he were to return.5 4.13 In conclusion, the State party emphasizes that the Russian Federation ratified the Convention on 3 March 1987 and recognized the competence of the Committee against Torture to receive and process individual communications under article 22 of the Convention. Thus, it argues, the complainant does not risk return to a state which is not a State party to the Convention and where the complainant does not have the possibility of applying to the Committee for protection.6 4 The State party refers I.O.A. v. Sweden, Complaint No. 65/1997, Views of 19 May 1998. It refers to K.N. v. Switzerland, Complaint No. 94/1997, Views of 19 May 1998. 6 Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, Complaint No. 15/1994, Views of 18 November 1994. Balabou Mutombo v. Switzerland, Complaint No. 13/1993, Views of 27 April 1994 and S.C. v. Denmark, Complaint No. 143/1999, Views of 3 September 2000. 5