01185927 002119-09-2007-ECCC/SC Doc No. F26112 deliberations,151 third persons' right against self-incrimination,152 family relations, 153 the right to privacy,154 State secrets,155 and professional ethics. 156 Depending on the purpose of the were sufficiently alleviated", R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, para. 3. Article 75 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure bans the admissibility of "evidence of the victim and of the witness, based on a surmise, a supposition or hearsay, as well as the testimony of the witness, who cannot indicate the source of his knowledge" (Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001, Amended 1 March 2012, Art. 75(2)(2)). See also, ibid., Article 193, establishing the inadmissibility of "a repeated identification of a person or of an object by the same identifYing person and by the same features". 151 At common law, the general principle is that anything said in the course of judicial proceedings is absolutely privileged (Irish Law Reform Commission, Civil Law of Defamation, Consultation Paper on the (LRC CP 31991) [1991] IELRC 2 (March 1991), p. 77). In the U.S. both tradition and the doctrine of separation of powers support the legitimacy of judicial privilege. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), para. 422 (the mental processes of a judge cannot be subjected to scrutiny, "[s]uch an examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility"); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, (D.C. Cir. 1971), pp. 1080-81. See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, (D.e.Cir.1973) (MacKinnon, 1., concurring), paras 740-742 (the source of judicial privilege is "rooted in history and gains added force from the constitutional separation of powers"); Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir.1993), p. 1344 ("[i]t has long been recognized that attempts to probe the thought and decision making processes of judges and administrators are generally improper"). See also, Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Canada (Labour Relatinos Board) (T.D.) [1996] 3 F.e. 609, p. 612 (Complete liberty of individual judges to decide the cases that come before them is the very essence of the principle of judicial independence. Complete liberty to decide can only exist if the judge is entirely free from interference in fact or attempted interference by any "outsider" with the way in which the judge conducts the case and makes his or her decision). In France, judges take an oath to "religiously" preserve the confidentiality of deliberations among other duties (Article 6 de I'ordonnance n058.1270 of 22 December 1958 contains the oath formula: "je jure de bien fidelement remplir mes fonctions, de garder religieusement Ie secret des deliberations et de me conduire en tout comme un digne et loyal magistrat"). In Russia, Article 56(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (footnote 149, above) exempts from testifying judges and jurors "about circumstances of the case, which have become known to them in connection with their participation in the procedure on the given criminal case". At the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber held in Delalic et at., AC, ICTY, 7 December 1999 at para 5: "[J]udicial deliberations and observations in relation to matters on which judges are required to adjudicate should not be the subject of compelled evidence before the International Tribunal or exposure in any forum other than the proper forum of published reasons for decision in a particular matter". 152 The right against self-incrimination has long been a principle at common law and was recognised in Section 3 of the UK Evidence Act 1851 c. 99, "[n ]othing [ ... ] shall render any person compellable to answer any question tending to criminate himself or herself'. See Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel, [1942] 2KB 253, p. 257, where the Plaintiffs claim that the investigation "would expose her to the risk of ecclesiastical penalties" as an adulterer were dismissed and "the rule [ ... ] that no one is bound to answer any question if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the deponent to any criminal charge, penalty [ ... ]" was upheld. Section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms grants constitutional protection against self-incriminatory witness testimony, "[a] witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings [ ... ]" (The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11). In the ECHR system, even where not explicit in the national law, the privilege against self-incrimination has been affirmed by the European Court, see Serves v. France, ECtHR, "Chamber Judgment", App. No. 20225/92, 20 October 1997, para. 47, where the Court held regarding a person summoned as witness "It is understandable that the applicant should fear that some of the evidence he might have been called upon to give before the investigating judge would have been self-incriminating. It would thus have been admissible for him to have refused to answer any questions from the judge that were likely to steer him in that direction."; K. v. Austria, ECtHR, "Chamber Judgment (struck out of the list)", App. No. 16002/90, 2 June 1993, which prompted reform of the Austrian criminal procedure to the effect that "[ a] witness, against whom on account of the same facts criminal proceedings are pending and who may incriminate himself through his own statements given as a witness, will therefore have an unconditional right to refuse to give evidence. This ensures that breaches of the Convention of this type can no longer arise" (at para. 14). See also Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic, 16 December 1992, Article 37(1), "[e]veryone has the right to refuse to give testimony if she would thereby incriminate herself or a person close to her" (Constitutional act No. 211993 Coil., as amended by Constitutional Act No. 16211998 Coll.). DECISION ON OBJECTIONS TO DOCUMENT LISTS - FULL REASONS 32/40