CAT/C/34/D/233/2003** Page 15 to frequent torture by Egyptian police, especially in terrorism-related investigations. Counsel argues that the complainant was not involved in any terrorist activities, and rejects any applicability of Security Council Resolution 1373. In any event, this resolution could not override other international obligations such as the Convention. Counsel denies that the complainant participated in terrorist activities, including through those organisations that the Security Police claimed he was involved in. In any case, allegations of involvement with terrorist organisations would only have served to heighten the existing interest of the Egyptian authorities in the complainant, an individual convicted of terrorist offences, and this aggravating circumstance exacerbating the risk of torture should have been considered by the State party prior to expelling him. 5.4 For counsel, the key issue is not whether a guarantee was given by a government official, but rather whether it can be implemented and, if so, how. The guarantee in question was obtained at short notice, vague in its terms and provided no details on how the guarantees would be given effect with respect to the complainant ; nor did the Egyptian government provide, or the Swedish authorities request, any such information. Neither did the Swedish authorities conceive an effective and durable arrangement for monitoring, conducting the first visit over a month after the complainant’s removal. This arrangement, coming shortly after the Committee had requested interim measures of protection with respect to the complainant’s wife, appeared to be an ad hoc reaction rather than part of a properly conceived monitoring plan. Counsel reiterates his criticisms of the effectiveness of the monitoring arrangements, observing that standard routines in such cases applied by organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross had not been met. In addition, the Swedish authorities apparently did not seek to call any medical expertise, particularly after the complainant’s direct allegation of torture in March 2003. Counsel contends that differences between the complainant’s testimony to his parents on one hand, and to Swedish authorities, unknown to him and accompanied by Egyptian authorities, on the other, are explicable. 5.5 Counsel criticizes the Committee’s decision on the complaint presented by the complainant’s wife, as the information that her husband had suffered ill-treatment, was based on a variety of sources and could not be dismissed as unfounded. Counsel disputes the State party’s interpretation of the jurisprudence of the European organs, viewing the content of the current guarantee and that offered by India in Chahal as “basically the same”. He observes that the Court did not doubt the good faith of the Indian government, but regarded the fundamental problem as human rights violations committed at the operational level by the security forces. In the present case, similarly, even assuming the same good will at the political level on the part of Egyptian authorities such as the representative with whom the guarantees were agreed, the reality at the lower operational levels of the state security services and other authorities with whom the complainant was in contact is that torture is commonplace. The Aylor-Davis case, by contrast, is inapposite as the guarantee there was offered by a State the circumstances of which cannot be compared to those appertaining in Egypt. 5.6 With respect to the State party’ statement that the Egyptian authorities rejected the allegations made by the complainant in March 2003, counsel observes that any contrary reaction would have been surprising, and that such refutation does not disprove the complainant’s allegation. In counsel’s view, the burden of proof to show ill- treatment did not occur rests with the State party, with the most effective capacity to present evidence and conduct appropriate supervision. Counsel submits that the State party has not discharged this burden.