5.5 Moreover, counsel is of the opinion that the assessment of risk made by the State party after the removal of the author is not satisfactory. The assessment should have taken place prior to the removal. 5.6 As for the current situation of the author, counsel acknowledges that she has been unable to communicate with him. Counsel argues, however, that the State party has not made any effort to verify the author's current situation and determine whether he is safe and at risk of being subjected to torture. Additional comments by State party 6.1 In a submission of 10 May 2000, the State party argued with regard to the admissibility of the case that a positive determination on the application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds could have enabled the author to remain in Canada. Furthermore, the State party reiterates its arguments that the removal of the author did not render his rights or pending actions ineffective or moot. 6.2 With regard to the merits of the case, the State party submits that, in its consideration as to whether the author constituted a danger to the public in Canada, the Minister did assess the risk faced by the author in case of return to Afghanistan. Such assessment was also done by the Federal Court Trial Division in its 12 November 1998 decision. 6.3 The State party finally reiterates its concern that the Committee should not become a fourth instance by re-evaluating findings of domestic courts unless there was a manifest error or if the decision was tainted by abuse of power, bad faith, manifest bias or serious irregularities. Additional comments by counsel on behalf of the author 7.1 In a submission of 7 June 2000, counsel underlined that the application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is not an effective remedy because it does not stay the removal; in any event it was useless to pursue an application challenging a decision of removal after the deportation had been executed. 7.2 Counsel also repeated that the "danger opinion" is not a risk assessment and that the decision of the Federal Court was based on misconstructions of evidence, and the judge had no expertise in assessing risk.