Until as late as October 2012 the administrative authorities of PDF No. 23 denied access to the monitoring group that included an Ombudsman’s representative in Issyk-Kul province. In October, the observers had a chance to carry out a monitoring visit in this institution, but the administrative authorities prohibited them from talking with the arrested individuals who were under investigation and placed in cells, referring to an order “from above.” As instructed by the chief, only convicts were taken out for interviews which were taking place in the training room of the facility. The issue of the SSEP not complying fully with its voluntary commitments under the MoU to ensure access to places of detention was discussed at each of the four meetings of special representatives from government bodies and other parties to the Memorandum. MoU partners continued to emphasize that monitoring of pre-trial detention facilities was of paramount importance, as it is crucial to further monitor those charged with committing crimes who were transferred from MoI isolators to PDFs. The fact that the accused who were allegedly subjected to torture are quickly transferred to pre-trial detention facilities to which observers have no access has been quite problematic. In the opinion of human rights activists, pre-trial detention facilities turned “into some kind of a place for concealing cases of torture.” As regards denied access, in some cases the management of PDFs were referring to certain operational and security circumstances, and in other cases they were asking for written approval from the leadership of the SSEP or permission of an investigator or a judge to communicate with those charged with committing offences or defendants. Regrettably, when partners stated that all observers had passed special training and that each of them had a manual prohibiting interference with the course of criminal proceedings, and that no complaints had been raised until that day, this did not prove convincing. Thus, the SSEP neglected its obligations under the MoU by not allowing observers to achieve monitoring goals to the maximum extent possible. On the other hand, the observers did not experience a single case when monitoring visits to reception centres under internal affairs bodies were hampered. It was not possible to adhere to the underlying principles of carrying out monitoring visits strictly in all cases, in particular as regards confidentiality and conversing with detainees in private. As can be gathered from monitoring group reports, in 35% of cases staff members of temporary detention facilities were present during interviews with detainees. A TDF guard in Tokmok insisted on being present during the interview From a monitoring group report. Temporary detention facility, Toktogul region: “During interviews with prisoners in the TDF of internal affairs bodies in the Toktogul region deputy head of the DDI and the chief of the TDF were standing close to the observers, and were listening to the entire conversation attentively.” From a monitoring group report. Temporary detention facility, Kochkor region: “During interviews with inmates in the TDF in the Kochkor region, the chief of the DDI was present.” From a monitoring group report. Temporary detention facility, Karakol: “The observers were talking in the yard of the TDF in Karakol where they took all the inmates. The conversation took place in the presence of the city prosecutor, a prosecutor from one of the units of the provincial prosecution office, and the chief and duty officer of the temporary detention facility.” 29