Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told Army reserve forces. The measure was said to be a result of "threats of military intervention". 35 On 17 March 1999 the OSCE-KVM Prizren Regional Centre reported a rise in tension with the start of a combined VJ and police operation against Korisa/Korishe and Kabas/Kabash (north-east of Prizren). The operation appeared directed at a unit of perhaps 20 UCK troops who were reported to have moved into Kabas a month earlier. Verifiers observed VJ and special combat police supported by tanks and antiaircraft artillery. The VJ became more obstructive towards the OSCE-KVM, denying it access to the VJ position at Dulje, one of the three authorized Combat Team locations as agreed in the 25 October Agreement. It was the second time access had been denied, when in the past they had been co-operative. In effect, Yugoslav preparations for a confrontation with NATO and operations with the aim of 36 defeating the UCK through piecemeal operations were well underway. Military operations 20 March - 10 June 1999 As noted in Chapter 1, the OSCE-KVM withdrew from Kosovo on 20 March 1999 when it became apparent that the security environment was no longer conducive to fulfilling the mission mandate. From 24 March through to 10 June, NATO launched an air and missile campaign against Yugoslavia, including the targeting of the Yugoslav/Serbian military and security apparatus in Kosovo. By March 1999, the Yugoslav military/security forces were coping with two tasks: defeating the UCK and preparing for an attack by NATO. The effect was to require the border areas to be secured, as seen with the VJ building up positions south of Gnjilane/Gjilan and entering villages in what otherwise had 37 been described as a "quiet district". However, more resources and attention went to the west of Kosovo and the border with Albania. Here existed not only a possible route for NATO to enter, but an area where the UCK was particularly active, with "safe havens" and supplies in Albania. Further, these supplies would be in a position to reach other UCK zones further into Kosovo if the military/security forces were not able to dominate the ground in the area. The Yugoslav/Serbian forces initially concentrated on securing the lines of communication - a task that had always been a priority and, as described, had already been started. Those villages lying along strategic routes (for example the road north from Pristina to Podujevo) were immediately shelled and cleared. The villages lying at important crossroads were also targeted, notably Studencane/Studencan (Suva Reka/Suhareke) (prior to the OSCE-KVM withdrawal) and Komorane/Komaran (Glogovac/ Gllogoc). The security forces also extended their push on Drenica and the areas in the west of Kosovo, particularly around Orahovac and Djakovica. While combating the UCK in the hills and villages, the security forces later attempted to deny the UCK their base of support including non-military supplies. In effect, this http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part1/ch3.htm (12 of 16)12/5/2003 11:48:47 AM