CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011 undertake to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation. This positive duty encompasses the obligation of States parties to protect women from being exposed to a real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence, irrespective of whether such consequences would take place outside the territorial boundaries of the sending State party: if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person’s rights under the Convention will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Convention. For example, a State party would itself be in violation of the Convention if it sent back a person to another State in circumstances in which it was foreseeable that serious gender-based violence would occur. 29 The foreseeability of the consequence would mean that there was a present violation by the State party, even though the consequence would not occur until later. What amounts to serious forms of gender-based violence will depend on the circumstances of each case and would need to be determined by the Committee on a case-by-case basis at the merits stage, provided that the author had made a prima facie case before the Committee by sufficiently substantiating such allegations. 8.11 In the present case, the Committee takes note of the author’s claim that she fears being subjected to female genital mutilation by her father and his family if she is returned to Uganda. It further notes that, according to the information provided by the author to the Danish asylum authorities and in the context of her communication to the Committee, she has not met her father since the age of 9 years and is unaware of any siblings, female relatives or any other women who have been circumcised. Furthermore, the author gave contradictory information as to her ethnicity/clan/tribe in Uganda and failed to provide, the repeated requests from the Committee notwithstanding (see paras. 2.8-2.10), any independent evidence supporting her claims that women belonging to the Mogishu ethnic group/tribe continued to be subjected to female genital mutilation in Uganda and that female circumcision was being practised on adult women who gave birth to a child or children. Even assuming that the name of the clan/tribe could have been misspelled by the Danish asylum authorities and the author’s ethnicity/tribe is indeed Bagishu, Bagisu or Mugisu, she provided no independent evidence showing that women belonging to the Bagishu, Bagisu or Mugisu ethnic group/tribe were being subjected to female genital mutilation in Uganda. In this context, the Committee also notes that the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act entered into force in Uganda on 9 April 2010. 8.12 In the circumstances and in the absence of any other pertinent information on file, the Committee considers that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, the claim that her removal from Denmark to Uganda would expose her to the real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence. The Committee notes that, under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol, it must declare a communication inadmissible where it is not sufficiently substantiated. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the communication is inadmissible under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol. 8.13 In the light of this conclusion, the Committee decides not to examine any other inadmissibility grounds invoked by the State party. __________________ 29 18/19 See Kindler v. Canada, footnote 26 above. 13-42827