Advance unedited version CCPR/C/133/D/2623/2015 for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 17 All relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.18 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists, 19 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 20 7.3 The Committee notes the author’s claims that his conversion to Christianity would put him at risk of being executed in Iran and of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in detention. It notes the author’s claims that his brother was executed as an opponent of the Iranian regime in 2006, and that he himself was detained and questioned as to whether he had converted to Christianity when he visited Iran in 2012. It also notes his claims that, as he does not have a valid Iranian passport or exit visa, he would be subjected to detention and questioning upon return. 7.4 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the fact that the author was able to travel to and depart from Iran in 2012 indicates that the Iranian authorities had little interest in him. It notes that the State party authorities found that the author had converted to Christianity, but noted that as the author would not be public about his conversion, he would not face risk upon return. The Committee notes the author’s argument that a letter from his pastor supports his claim that he is a witnessing and evangelizing member of his congregation and that his name and conversion to Christianity has been made public on the internet by church activists who were trying to prevent his deportation. It notes his claim that he is a member of a congregation that is expected to proselytize and his argument that he should not be required to practice his faith in secret, in fear, and without a church or fellowship with others. 7.5 Concerning the author’s claims that he would be at risk of persecution if returned to Iran on the basis of his conversion, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the test is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that such a conversion may have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin such as to create a real and personal risk of irreparable harm as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, the authorities should proceed to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the behaviour and activities of the asylum seeker in connection with his or her conversion or convictions, could have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin so as to put him or her at risk of irreparable harm. 21 7.6 In the present case, the Committee observes that it is not contested that the author’s conversion was considered to be genuine by the State party authorities. The Committee however notes that in assessing the author’s PRRA application the domestic authorities found, based on country reports, that the author did not have such a profile that would indicate that he would be of interest to the Iranian authorities. The Committee further notes the information that the author travelled to and from Iran in 2012, and that , while claiming to be lacking a valid Iranian passport and exit visa, he has provided no information on how he entered and departed from Iran during the visit with his mother in 2012. The Committee further notes that, while the author disagrees with the findings of the State party authorities as to the risk of harm he claims he would face in Iran because of his conversion, he has failed to provide any pertinent information to the Committee to justify his claim that his alleged conversion would be known to the Iranian authorities, that he would practise Christianity in Iran that would draw the attention of the authorities, or that he has been targeted by the Iranian authorities on the basis of his conversion. 17 18 19 20 21 X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; X v. Sweden, para. 5.18; Q.A. v Sweden, para. 9.3; A.E. v Sweden, para 9.3. Ibid. See also X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; Q.A. v Sweden, para. 9.3 A.E. v Sweden, para 9.3. Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4. For example, K v. Denmark, para. 7.4; Y.A.A. and F.H.M. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015) para. 7.3; and Rezaifar v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2512/2014), para. 9.3; Q.A. v Sweden, para. 9.3 A.E. v Sweden, para 9.3. S.A.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2419/2014), para. 11.8. Q.A. v Sweden, (CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017), para. 9.5, J.I. v Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3032/2017), para 7.5. See also European Court of Human Rights, F.G. v. Sweden, para. 156. 9