CCPR/C/115/D/2344/2014 in which the potential harm at stake is relatively limited, such as actions for monetary payment or removal of unlawful constructions. In the present case, however, the consequences of refusal to stay execution would be irreparable, as the execution of the administrative decision entails removing the authors to Albania, thus exposing them to the risk that they may lose their lives. A second risk is that of preventing them from attending the hearing in their case. 5.4 On the admissibility arguments raised by the State party, the authors reiterate their previous argument that they would be deprived of their right to a fair trial if they were prevented from attending the hearing in their case, namely, the appeal against the unfavourable administrative decision in their asylum proceedings. 5.5 The authors reject the State party’s statement that their claims are unsubstantiated under articles 6, 14 and 26 of the Covenant. Regarding article 26, they reiterate that several Albanian asylum seekers in comparable circumstances have been given access to appeals proceedings before the refugee appeals board in cases of blood feuds, which amounts to discrimination in their regard. State party’s observations on the merits 6.1 On 5 August 2014, the State party submitted observations on the merits of the case. It first noted that, contrary to the authors’ claim on discrimination, since the immigration service refused the authors’ claim for asylum in July 2012, the refugee appeals board has not granted asylum in any case concerning Albanian asylum seekers claiming fear of blood revenge. As a matter of fact, the board has not granted asylum to any Albanian asylum seekers at all since 2003. 6.2 The State party recalls that, when the authors instituted proceedings before the District Court of Copenhagen, their primary claim was to be granted asylum and their alternative claim was for access to appeal the refugee appeals board. On 22 May 2014, the District Court of Copenhagen delivered a judgement in the case, finding in favour of the immigration service. The District Court determined that it had not been substantiated that the immigration service had made any procedural error or that there were any defects in the decision. Consequently, the Court found no basis for disregarding the discretionary conclusion of the immigration service, which determined the authors’ claim under the “manifestly unfounded” procedure, a conclusion that was endorsed by the Danish Refugee Council. 6.3 On 3 June 2014, the authors appealed the decision of the District Court of Copenhagen to the High Court of Eastern Denmark. 6.4 Concerning the authors’ claim under article 14 of the Covenant, the State party refers to its previous observations on admissibility and reiterates that asylum proceedings do not fall within the scope of article 14 and that this part of the communication should therefore be considered inadmissible ratione materiae pursuant to article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 On the merits, the State party dismisses the authors’ allegations under articles 6, 14 and 26 of the Covenant by referring to its previous submissions on admissibility. It concludes that the authors have failed to establish a prima facie case and that their communication should therefore be found manifestly unfounded and accordingly declared inadmissible. Furthermore, the State party maintains that the communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission. 7