Chapter 1 — Trial Monitoring: Purpose and Basic Principles or in perception — the exclusive decision-making authority of the court. Creating the suspicion of trying to influence the judiciary can jeopardize trial-monitoring operations and is seen to risk inducing retribution on the part of the authorities against judges who have communicated with monitors. Most trial-monitoring programmes stipulate that non-intervention means no engagement or interaction with the court regarding the merits of an individual case and no attempts to influence indirectly outcomes in cases through informal channels. Even where objectively fairer outcomes in individual cases might result from interventions, such interventions can have the consequence of compromising the judiciary’s independence. As a result, all OSCE trial-monitoring programmes prohibit such interventions. On the other hand, most programmes do allow communication — by legal analysts, managers or monitors — on administrative or general legal matters. The rationale behind this approach is founded on a less restrictive interpretation of the role of monitoring. This approach holds that judicial independence should not be used as an excuse to cover up corrupt or non-objective behaviour, to unduly limit judges’ freedom of expression and opinion compatible with their function, or to shield them from review of their practices or from communication with professionals in general. Under this approach, there would be no restraint on communicating with the judiciary on issues that do not impact on their duty to decide independently, impartially and in accordance with the law and evidence.13 Furthermore, the principle of non-intervention needs to be seen in light of the purposes of monitoring. In fact, even the presence of a monitor at proceedings or the issuance of a report could be perceived as a form of “intervention”. However, such a presence can have a positive human rights impact, since it may result in better court practices and limit arbitrariness. Moreover, the essence of a trial-monitoring programme is not to gather and store away information on problematic court practices. Making such findings available does not improperly interfere with the court’s execution of the laws in individual cases but provides information regarding the system’s functioning. Hence, inevitably, trial monitoring is intended by its nature to “intervene” in the sense of having a positive effect on the system overall, including on the conduct of judges in general. The variations in implementation of the principle of non-intervention also apply to contacts of trial monitors with prosecutors and lawyers. Some programmes follow a strict interpretation that prohibits meetings between monitors and prosecutors and lawyers, while others regard such meetings as a routine part of information gathering. In all cases, however, monitors should avoid any actions that could be regarded as constituting improper interference. 1.2.2 Principle of objectivity The principle of objectivity requires that trial-monitoring programmes accurately report on legal proceedings using clearly defined and accepted standards and apply these standards impartially. The principle derives from the utility of trial monitoring as a diagnostic tool and the need to produce accurate and reliable information regarding the functioning of the justice system. Minimizing the perception of bias also serves to encourage the acceptance of a programme’s findings, conclusions and recommendations among the broadest possible group of stakeholders. Monitoring findings and reports must, therefore, be based upon domestic law and clearly articulated international standards, so that the basis for conclusions is clear and objective. Additionally, 13  For instance, monitoring personnel would be able to ask judges to enable their reviewing a court file in their possession if unable to access it through the court administration, inquire about general difficulties they face in their work or problems that they identify in the system, their perception on legal trends, invite them to share their views on general findings reflected in reports before or after publication, and other similar advocacy issues. 19