38 Trial Monitoring: A Reference Manual for Practitioners provided ­de ­facto, a programme should seriously consider the pros and cons of seeking to also formalize it through the conclusion of an MoU. The same effect as an MoU can also be achieved by an “exchange of letters” between high-level officials. For instance, the ad hoc programme to observe the trials in Minsk of i­ ndividuals criminally charged in connection with the events following the 19 December 2010 Belarusian elections was based on an exchange of letters between the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the OSCE and the Director of ODIHR. This exchange of letters set out the modalities for monitoring these trials. Face-to-face meetings regarding the conclusion of an MoU provide an opportunity to explain the programme’s purpose and methods, as well as to build trust and understanding with local officials. To this end, meetings should be used to inquire about and take into account the concerns of actors in the justice system. For instance, managers may consider including in their list of issues to be monitored any topics that justice officials deem significant for monitoring, such as problems with resources or personal security. In this way, the MoU process furthers the principle of agreement at the operational level, and the programme can be presented not only as putting the conduct of justice officials under the microscope, but also as an opportunity to help overcome problems identified by these officials. This approach can increase the programme’s acceptance. Consistent with diplomatic protocol, an MoU should be negotiated by a representative of the monitoring organization commensurate in rank with the representative of the local authority. Whenever possible, it is better to have programme managers participating in the negotiations. Depending on the circumstances, an MoU should seek to include the following elements: • a statement of the legal basis for monitoring, including reference to the OSCE field operation’s mandate, OSCE commitments and the right to a public trial as set forth in international and/or domestic law; • a statement specifying the scope and purpose of monitoring, potentially including which courts and kinds of proceedings will be monitored; • a detailed specification of the right of access, including, if possible, access to closed hearings, specific court documents and other files; and • other obligations and reasonable concerns of the parties. Further to the last two points, some MoUs negotiated for OSCE programmes have provided access to proceedings and documents beyond what is stipulated in domestic law. For example: • the right to request files through the Ministry of Justice if they cannot be obtained from courts (OSCE Office in Zagreb); • the obligation of the prosecutor-general to identify to the trial-monitoring co-ordinator any cases involving domestic violence (OSCE Mission to Moldova); and • the right to monitor investigative proceedings and closed hearings (OSCE Mission in Kosovo). For their part, programmes have undertaken reasonable obligations in MoUs, including agreements to: • assume a non-interventionist role with respect to individual cases; • maintain as confidential certain information obtained in the course of monitoring; • issue and disseminate a public report on its findings; and • share reports with domestic authorities in advance of their publication. Even if authorities are unwilling to sign a formal MoU, informal consent can often be obtained. Thus, at a minimum, the relevant authorities will have been advised in advance of the purpose and methodology of monitoring.