C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y standard.”427 By failing to consider this issue, Newman rightly observes that the Court left room for controversial interpretations of the standard of proof.428 Referring to Jackson v. Virginia429 – in which the US Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether and how the reasonable doubt standard affected the constitutional sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case – Newman argues that the Court incorrectly interpreted the Winship holding by making two different statements about its requirements. 430 In Jackson, the Court stated: (1) “[a]fter Winship the critical inquiry … must be … whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;” and (2) “the relevant question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”431 Newman interprets the first statement as follows: “whether the law’s ubiquitous reasonable person, in this case, a reasonable jury, could find the matter proven by the requisite degree of persuasion, in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.”432 In his view, this is the correct test for determining sufficiency of evidence.433 The second statement, according to Newman, presents the idea of a “random distribution of reasonable juries, with the risk of creating the misleading impression that just one of them needs to be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt.”434 Newman argues that the second statement “shifts the emphasis away from the law’s construct of the reasonable jury and conjures up the image of a vast random distribution of reasonable juries.”435 He also observes – as the case law that follows shows – that only the second sentence has been followed by most appellate courts since the Jackson case.436 Newman suggests “courts must do more than verbalize the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard in jury instructions,”437 and jury instructions must be made clearer. He recommends the Federal Judicial Center Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions:438 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 986 (1993) (hereinafter “Newman”). Newman, p. 986. 429 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, (1979) (hereinafter “Jackson”). 430 Newman, p. 987, citing Jackson, at 316-317. 431 Jackson, at 318-319 (italics in original). 432 Newman, p. 987. 433 Newman, p. 987. 434 Newman, p. 987. 435 Newman, p. 987. 436 Newman, p. 988, citing United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.1953 (1993); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 448 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). 437 Newman, p. 990. 438 The Pattern Instructions are non-binding model instructions developed by the Federal Judicial Center, an education and research agency for the federal courts, established in 1967 to promote improvements in judicial administration. 427 428 101