C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y Another influential treatise was authored by James Wilson, Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court and Professor of Law.226 Wilson relied on a different philosophical school, the Scottish common sense school. The common sense school developed a philosophy that modified Locke’s principles, rejecting the old philosophical tradition that certainty could be reached by demonstration only. Philosophers of the common sense school insisted that such a position had no meaning in ordinary life, as it would classify any testimony as merely probable.227 For the common sense philosophers, well-attested facts were classified as knowledge, as opposed to opinion or probability.228 Wilson distinguished between two varieties of reasoning: demonstrative and moral. Demonstrative reasoning yielded abstract truths, while moral reasoning was about “real but contingent truths and connections which take place among things actually existing.”229 According to Wilson, testimony was one of the most important sources of moral evidence.230 He discussed the reasons for doubting the credibility of witness testimony, such as the competence of the witness, prior false testimony by the witness, the witness’s reputation, and the manner in which the witness testified.231 Also, in capital (death penalty) cases, according to Wilson, the evidence must be so strong as to “force belief.”232 Wilson raised the issue of jurors’ doubt while considering the problem of unanimous verdicts. For instance, if a “single doubt” remains in the mind of any juror, he must dissent. If other jurors believe that dissent, they must agree to an acquittal.233 The growing importance of the term “reasonable doubt” can be seen in nineteenth century treatises. For instance, the Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the Crown by Leonard Macnally “played a crucial role in enunciating and publicizing the beyond reasonable doubt standard.”234 Macnally observed that it is a rule of law that “if a jury entertain[s] a reasonable doubt upon the truth of the witness’s testimony,” it must acquit.235 He further suggests that “unless [a witness’s] testimony be supported by clear and unsuspicious collateral proof of the facts charged on the prisoner by the indictment, doubt must arise in the minds of jurors; and, by the humanity of the law, where doubt is created, an acquittal ought to be the consequence.”236 The Works of James Wilson, in 2 vols., (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (hereinafter “Wilson”). Online version is available at http://www.constitution.org/jwilson/jwilson.htm (last accessed 14 April 2016). 227 For a discussion of the Scottish common sense school see Selwyn A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, (Oxford 1960). 228 Shapiro, Doubt, p. 29. 229 Wilson, vol. 1, p. 518-19. 230 Wilson, vol. 1, p. 508, 510. 231 Wilson, vol. 1, p. 508. 232 Wilson, vol. 1, p. 503-04, vol. 2, p. 232. 233 Wilson, vol. 2, p. 235. 234 Shapiro, Doubt, p. 29. 235 Leonard Macnally, The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the Crown: Illustrated from Printed and Manuscript Trials and Cases 2 (J. Butterworth and J. Cooke 1802) (hereinafter “Macnally”), available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008620484. 236 Macnally, p. 3 (italics in original). 226 47