C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y comment on the evidence for the jury’s consideration in its deliberation.271 Thus, even in common law systems, there is an element of truth-seeking. Judges have expressed mixed views on these discretionary powers being entrusted to judges, as seen by US Federal Judge, Jack B. Weinstein, and US Supreme Court Justice, Felix Frankfurter. Judge Weinstein: A great deal of the dispute about the matter is caused by differences between rhetoric affirming the court’s power and the practice where the judge tends to act as an impartial arbiter in our adversarial system. Much difficulty would be avoided if it were clearly understood that the court trying a case should have, and does have, no views as to which side ought to win, or how much plaintiff in a civil case should recover, or whether a defendant in a criminal case – unless and until he is convicted – should be punished. If a reasonable juror could find, either way, the juror is entitled not to have the court throw its enormous prestige in to the scale on the side of one litigant or the other.272 Justice Frankfurter has a different opinion: Federal judges are not referees at prize fights, but functionaries of justice … As such, they have a duty of initiative to see that the issues are determined within the scope of the pleadings, not left to counsel’s chosen argument … [A] Federal judge … has the power to call and examine witnesses to elicit the truth … He surely has the duty to do so before resorting to guesswork in establishing liability for fault.273 The judges in the region no longer seek for the objective, material truth, either. For example, judges in BiH are no longer obliged to fully and truthfully establish the facts which are important for rendering a legal verdict. Instead, it kept the provision according to which “the Court, the prosecutor and other bodies participating in the proceedings are bound to objectively study and establish with equal attention facts that are exculpatory as well as inculpatory for the suspect or the accused”.274 271 In the UK, the judge usually sums up the evidence for the jury. In Regina v. Brower, [1995] Crim. L.R. 746, the Court of Appeal stated that in the majority of cases the judge should sum up the evidence to the jury in order to assist the jury and to ensure a fair trial. In Regina v. Evans, (1990) 91 Cr.App.R. 173, the Court of Appeal held that the judge is not limited to the points made by the parties, but is entitled to comment on all the matters given in evidence.  Of course, the judge’s comments must be kept within proper bounds, but in Regina v. Sparrow, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 488, 495, Justice Lawton noted the judge’s duty to assist the jury and stated: “…in our experience a jury is not helped by a colourless reading out of the evidence as recorded by the judge in his notebook. The judge is more than a referee who takes no part in the trial save to intervene when a rule of procedure is broken. He and the jury try the case together and it is his duty to give them the benefit of his knowledge of the law and to advise them in the light of his experience as to the significance of the evidence.” See generally Saltzburg, disagreeing with the judge’s authority to sum up and to comment upon evidence and urging that trial judges be granted only the most limited authority to call and to interrogate witnesses. 272 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and State Courts, § 107[1], at 8, as cited in Saltzburg, p. 41. 273 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948), Frankfurter J. dissenting. (internal citations omitted). 274 Article 14. 61