Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt Chief Justice Shaw went on to define the reasonable doubt standard: Then, what is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence, and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.400 Chief Justice Shaw’s definition of reasonable doubt would be widely adopted by other courts. For instance, in Victor v. Nebraska (1994), the US Supreme Court noted with approval the Webster definition as “probably the most satisfactory definition given to the words ‘reasonable doubt’ in any case known to criminal jurisprudence.”401 Some commentators criticized the Webster charge.402 Judge May, a contemporary of Justice Shaw, noted that although the attempt to define reasonable doubt in Webster was “unsuccessful” and “unfortunate,” “the effort to give it a more practical and comprehensible exposition gives promise of a reform which must be hailed with satisfaction.”403 William Trickett in his article, Preponderance of Evidence, and Reasonable Doubt (1906), criticized Chief Justice Shaw’s instruction arguing that “it is impossible to see how an ordinary juror is to be aided by being told that if he is morally certain of the prisoner’s guilt, he is to convict him.”404 Webster, at 320 (emphasis added). Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 7 (1994) (hereinafter “Victor”). 402 See infra subsection Post-Victor Jurisprudence of the US Circuit Courts of Appeal. 403 May, p. 663-64. 404 Trickett, p. 85. 400 401 96