C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y applicant was finally convicted of the crimes of threat of terrorism and of inciting ethnic hostility. The Court reiterated that Article 6 (2), in its relevant aspect, is aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with the proceedings and that presumption of innocence does not only prohibit the premature expression by the tribunal itself of the opinion that the person “charged with a criminal offence” is guilty before he has been so proved according to law, but also covers statements made by other public officials about pending criminal investigations which encourage the public to believe the suspect is guilty and to prejudge the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority. Besides, the Court stressed that Article 6 (2) could not prevent the authorities from informing the public about criminal investigations in progress, but it required that they do so with all the discretion and circumspection necessary. However, it was specified by the Court that a fundamental distinction had to be made between a statements that someone is only suspected of having committed a crime and an adamant declaration, in the absence of a final conviction, that an individual has committed the crime. The Court emphasised the importance of the choice of words in the public officials’ statements before a person has been tried and found guilty: whether a statement made by a public official is a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence must be determined on the particular circumstances in which the impugned statement was made; in the present case, the impugned statement was made by the Prosecutor General in an interview to the press, in a context independent of the criminal proceedings. The Court emphasized the fact that the applicant was a well-known journalist, which required from the State officials, including the Prosecutor General, to keep the public informed about the alleged crime and the ensuing criminal proceedings. However, these circumstances could not justify the absolute lack of caution in the choice of words used by officials in their statements. Furthermore, the statement at issue was made just a few days following the initiation of the criminal investigation – it is particularly important that in the initial stage, even before the applicant has been formally charged, public allegations which could be interpreted as confirmation of the applicant’s guilt should not be made as an opinion given by a senior public official. The Prosecutor General’s statement unequivocally declared that the applicant’s article indeed contained a threat of terrorism and that “this information constitutes a threat of terrorism”. Given the high position held by the Prosecutor General, particular caution should have been exercised in the choice of words for describing the pending criminal proceedings. Therefore the Court considered that these specific remarks, made without any qualification or reservation, amounted to a declaration that the applicant had committed the criminal offence of threat of terrorism. 149